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Trust in Smart Home technology security is a primary concern for consumers, which can prevent them from adopting smart home services. Such concerns are due to following reasons; (i)
nature of IoT devices– which due to their limited computational and resource capabilities, cannot
support traditional on-device security controls (ii) any breach to cyber-attacks have an immediate
impact on the smart homeowner, compared to traditional cyber-attacks (iii) a large variety of different applications and services under the umbrella of make an overarching security framework for
smart homes fundamentally challenging for both providers to offer and owners to manage.
This dissertation offers a unified approach towards establishing trust scores as an indicator of
the security status of an IoT device in a smart home. The approach is said to be unified because it
is independent of attack types or device manufacturer or protocols compared to existing solutions
that treat each of these aspects in silos. The proposed dissertation can be viewed as a series of
sequential modules that are invoked one after the other. There are three main phases: evidence
collection, a trust scoring model, trust management, and updates.
Specifically, for evidence collection, we propose a pre-processing step, that involves the design
of an access control mechanism that takes a service-level view rather than a device-level view,
establishing baseline rules of authorized communication flows. Then our evidence collection pro-

poses a unified set of factors that are affected significantly if a smart home IoT device is under
attack. Such a body of evidence carefully collected over certain temporal granularities, serve as
inputs to the proposed trust scoring module.
The trust scoring module maps the device-specific evidence (observations) into a trust score,
such that it can produce lower trust scores when devices are under attack. Specifically, we propose a
Bayesian Belief based Model augmented with novel non-linear weighing and activation functions,
designed specifically for our problem. The weighing functions are designed such that depending
on the severity of the attack surface, probabilistic discounting of parts of the evidence caused by
benign changes are appropriately embedded in the scoring module that explains the success under
attacks.
Finally, the scores are fed to a trust management and update module that counters real-time
temporal evolution of real cyber-attacks. Specifically, we propose a four-factor asymmetric trust
update scheme that can defend against advanced attack strategies such as on-off and incremental
ramp attacks.
For evaluation of the framework, we use three real datasets that contain a variety of actual
cyber-attacks and benign datasets. Our evaluation seeks to investigate the generality of our framework across multiple datasets, with various devices and cyber-attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In this current decade, human civilization is at the crossroads of a breakthrough advance that is
going to connect our physical living spaces with the cyber world in an unprecedented manner,
thereby potentially expanding the current realm of the internet. This breakthrough advancet that
is popularly termed as the Internet of Things (IoT), whereby various day to day physical objects
(other than phones and laptops), become a part of the internet and communicate and make decisions, just the way humans do. The advent of IoT technology has primarily been envisioned to
increase the quality and ease of human life to an unprecedented level. IoT smart technology is
finding its way into self-driving cars, intelligent transportation infrastructure, clean and connected
electrical grids, and above all, smart and connected homes.

1.1 Smart Home IoT Technology

A Smart Home is an IoT environment offering smart services inside a home. Such services are offered to home inhabitants via a network of communication-enabled devices that contain embedded
software, which can communicate with each other/remote service providers, and make decisions
without human intervention. A typical Smart home has IoT devices that act as sensors/actuators
and control a unit server based on its role [1]. Sensory IoT devices measure some SH properties
such as light, temperature, motion, ultrasonic frequencies, heat, and send these measurements to a
controller hosted typically at an edge/fog server depending on the implementation.
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IoT devices can act directly to provide some SH service. Alternatively, servers could command
other IoT devices that have an actuators role that reacts to a control command that is issued based
on aggregated sensory output. However, there are IoT devices that act as both sensors and actuators
and need no server intervention.
IoT devices are essentially sensors/actuators with an IP address as well as firmware that connects the device to the Internet for gathering physical asset information. IoT allows the system to
collect information and to use it in many applications such as resource control [2].
IoT devices are managed by an edge/fog domain that manages and allows the mapping of
communications between the IoT devices in the edge domain (SH), and apps/servers using a smart
home controller that uses a Software Defined Network (SDN). Multiple edge/fog domains are
managed by a wide area cloud domain that takes a community-wide view of the threat landscape
of a given smart connected community.

1.2 Unique Vulnerabilities of Smart Homes

Homes are the most private and vulnerable of all physical spaces where humans occupy themselves
during a typical day. When an individual is at home it is taken for granted that it is safer than anywhere else in the same geographical vicinity. However, smart homes expose our personal spaces to
the internet, which is known to be vulnerable to several classes of cyber-attacks. Nonetheless, traditionally cyberthreats had economic impacts on businesses and breaches of personal data at rest.
In contrast, in the evolving paradigm of smart homes, those cyber world attacks can now affect our
personal spaces and have an immediate civilian impact while also creating potential real-time data
breaches that are riskier. Whats more, there are new threats that are technology-specific. These
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threats need to be handled explicitly, rather than just the older threats affecting us in a new way.
Additionally, there is a tremendous privacy threat, which makes it difficult for customers to
trust the adoption of this new technology. While individuals may legitimately feel skeptical about
smart home technologies, the fact is that there are broader societal and environmental benefits of
smart homes that form the core component of smart connected communities. Hence, a responsible
society should not unilaterally dismiss the adoption of smart homes. It is here that the tension between the smart homes benefits and concerns over our security begins, and thus creates a desperate
need for a framework that can instill trust in customers.
The internal and/or external attacker expects that the SH owner is not fully aware of whether
or not the IoT device is functioning in a compliant manner.. Furthermore, the security level and
mechanism used in IoT devices are based on device specifications, ability, and functionality. Despite that, the attacker could compromise the IoT device nevertheless, even with a high or low
computation ability.
IoT devices provide features such as allowing homeowners to change the temperature or turn
on/off lights remotely by direct interaction between the IoT devices and SH users. These very
features also r present privacy concerns and security risks.
An example of privacy concerns is personal digital assistance such as that offered by Amazon
Echo devices which have access to owner email, calendar, as well as adjusting the temperature
and analyzing previous activities to provide the best services. Other examples include a smart
thermostat, light bulbs, etc. in which a vendor collects data about SH user habits and activities and
may make this data available to a third party for marketing or advertising. Also, cybercriminals
may use IoT devices to access the SH network and steal private data [3]. This presents the need
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for a trusted IoT system to maintain the SH users privacy and security.

1.3 Challenges and Motivation

In this section, we layout specific challenges and problems in existing smart homes and IoT device
security.
IoT Device Characteristics: devices have unique challenges that go beyond traditional cyber
systems. IoT devices are not as powerful in computing capabilities as laptops, PCs and mobile
phones, given the limited power requirement of IoT devices, and the low computational hardware
capabilities of IoT devices. Therefore, strong on-device security controls cannot be deployed.
Thus, these limitations mean that SH devics e cannot have the same device security levels that
traditional cyber components could typically have. eXtensible Markup Language (XML) security
standard encryption and WES-Encryption are two examples of techniques that are not feasible in
IoT devices due to their higher power consumption requirements. Furthermore, XML Canonicalisation (XML C14N) t is costly in terms of computation time and memory and it is not efficient for
use in IoT devices.
Yet another limitation of IoT entities is that frequent updating and patching of embedded device
security services are not possible, because some IoT device do not support user interfaces and
others require connecting to a laptop separately for key updates. Therefore, maintenance and
distribution of credentials for embedded devices are complex. , IoT devices may also connect to a
network that has limited or no access to the Certificate Authority (CA).
Smart Home Characteristics: Every smart home deploys at least 15 or more IoT devices.
Thus, due to the sheer number of these new IoT devices, it becomes easier for attackers to weaponize
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these IoT devices for their cybe-attack goals. As an example, a typical denial of service attack (to
keep an important server busy such that it is unable to offer its services), becomes easier for adversaries, since they can create a large botnet easily to send bogus requests from these weaponized
IoT devices to the victim server. Additionally, in a smart home there are other non-IoT devices
which can be used for lateral movement of attack exploits from those devices into the IoT devices.
Finally, smart home data generated by an IoT entity can contain private and sensitive information such as personal identification information and information related to user behavior, hence
there is an inherent trust gap between service providers and consumers.
Variety in Attack Types and Devices: Most current defense mechanisms are tailored for one
kind of attack or for a certain manufacturer/provider of devices. However, a smart home is a
confluence of a myriad number of applications from heterogeneous sets of devices from various
manufacturers which vary greatly in their design, and they are vulnerable to a wide variety of
different attacks. Recently, there has been some interest in applying machine learning and AI
techniques for the detection of attacks in smart home IoT devices. However, feature engineering
is not unified and each attack is learned separately while learning of features. Additionally, a lot
of uncertainty and noise exists in the data flows that make inference on the security status of the
devices tough.
Finally, in previous work that have applied machine learning for smart home IoT security focus
on retrospective identification that can infer the security status of a device after the whole test set
has been fed to the classifier. Thus, they do not support real-time identification of attacks, and none
of the prior work has been shown to generalize across multiple datasets, thus raising concerns on
the generality of those approaches.
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Research Hypothesis: The research problem stated above can be addressed by the following
research hypothesis: Security and privacy in IoT systems can be assured using low complexity
trust-based scoring at the network edge in a unified manner that is applicable to a broad class of
attack types and devices, thus eliminating the need for a multitude of different defense mechanisms
on the fog domain that has sparse computation s. strength.
IoT systems should be designed and built with the concept of trust. Can we make this visible
to the end consumer so that they can review the behavior of their own smart IoT devices and make
decisions regardin access privilege revocation themselves? All prior studies did not indicate how a
user without technical knowledge would know if their devices are good or compromised, and it is
not likely that the average consumer would have access to scientific research on the topic.
SH users do not have knowledge about which IoT devices talk to which cloud endpoints, or
which services can be exposed on the network, not to mention which IoT devices might impact
their personal information , or even if the device will impact network QoS. Understanding these
questionswill be able to bridge the trust gap between providers and consumers and help the eventual
widespread adoption and market penetration of smart home IoT technologies.

1.4 Key Contributions of this Work

In this section, we outline the key aspects of this dissertation. First, we provide a broad outline of
our contribution and an overarching sketch of the proposed solution. Then, we delineate the salient
parts of the contribution and discuss specific details separately.
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1.4.1

Broad Outline of the Contribution

In this dissertation, we propose a trust scoring model that can be deployed as a part of a fog
domain middleware, that assigns each IoT device a trust score based on observed data flows. The
trust scoring model is designed in such a way that IoT devices that are actually attacked by an
adversary or used indirectly for launching cyber-attacks receive a much lower trust score.
The proposed dissertation can be viewed as a series of sequential modules that are invoked one
after the other. There are three main phases: evidence collection, a trust scoring model, and classification to find the compromised devices or ascertaining the incidence of attacks. For evidence
collection we need a pre-processing step, which is the design of a service level access control list
that takes a service-level view rather than a device-level view of establishing baseline rules of authorized communication flows. Next, the evidence collection proposes a unified set of factors that
will be affected significantly if a device is under attack. Such evidence serves as input to a trust
scoring model which maps such device-specific evidence (observations) into a trust score, such that
it can produce low trust scores when devices are under attack. Finally, the scores are supplied to a
classifier which ascertains the incidence of attacks. We prove this by showing that on an attacked
dataset, the same trust model for the same device produces significantly lower scores as compared
to a non-attacked dataset.

1.4.2

Service Level Access Control at FIoT

Access Control Lists give a baseline authorization and authentication rule in a given network.
The novelty of an access control list is that instead of taking a device-level view, it takes a
service level view of the client (IoT) side as well as the server-side (IoT service providers). Specif7

ically, the behavior of the applications . that run on each IoT device and request services are taken
into account. We propose the use of either a manufacturer usage description (if available), or automatic self-learning of the baseline access rules by the fog domain trust middleware. This is done
by using a dynamic access control scheme that is formed by configuring direct mapping between
apps that run on IoT devices and corresponding services.

1.4.3

Device Specific Evidence Collection

We propose a small set of common factors and corresponding features that are affected by a wide
range of attack types and are independent of the device manufacturer or provider, making our
method a unified approach compared to other approaches that require separate learning or accommodations for each attack or device type. The proposed factors include service access uncertainty,
the volume of uncertain accesses, service access violation, service violation diversity, and outgoing
transmission volume. We provide justification on why these factors are affected by a wide range of
attack types. These set of common factors and features are subjected to all outgoing and incoming
flows to and from IoT devices in a smart home to generate a piece of device-specific evidence over
a discrete-time interval containing numeric values of features in each discrete time interval. This
body of evidence over time is supplied to the proposed trust scoring model.

1.4.4

Trust Scoring Model

The trust scoring module maps the time sequence of evidence into a time sequence of trust score
values. The trust scoring function is the most novel and critical part of this module which proposes
a Bayesian Belief based Model augmented with novel non-linear weighing and activation func-
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tions, (forming an explainable neural network architecture) designed specifically for our problem.
The weighing functions are designed such that the severity of the attack surface, and the probabilistic discounting of parts of the evidence caused by benign changes are appropriately embedded
in the scoring module that evaluates success under attacks.

1.4.5

Trust Management Update and Classification

We propose a trust management function that converts the time sequence of individual trust values
into a cumulative moving trust score for instantaneous detection of devices upon attacks. The
next stage is classification and parameter learning, where a method for identifying a threshold and
parameters of the trust scoring function are proposed.
Specifically, real-time trust scores for each time window are fed to a trust management and
update module that counters temporal real-time evolution of real cyber-attacks. Specifically, we
propose a four-factor asymmetric trust update scheme that can defend against advanced attack
strategies such as on-off and incremental ramp attacks. We deal with a supervised and semisupervised approach to finding the threshold that could distinguish between steady compromised
and honest IoT devices.

1.4.6

Evaluation with Proof of Generality:

We evaluate our framework with data collected from real smart home IoT devices containing labeled data for network traffic .pcap files for ten benign days and five attacked days. The total hours
for each device are around 350 hours obtained from [4]. Additionally, to prove our method is not
dataset-specific we apply it to two other datasets to prove generality [5]
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1.5 Benefits of this Work

In this section, we discuss some of the major beneficial aspects of our proposed framework.
The first benefit of our work is that we take a unified (generic) approach towards attack detection and classification. The term unified means that the success of the detection of malicious
devices or the trust scoring model is independent of attack types and IoT device/app heterogeneity.
This is in contrast to all existing works that learn patterns of different attack types [6, 7] or works
for a given class of IoT devices [8].
The second benefit is that our framework can be tuned to offer immediate real-time detection
unlike some existing works [4] that focus on retrospective identification (i.e., they take a whole
attack dataset and show that at the end of it, they find some anomalous patterns). In contrast, our
work supports a real-time framework where the trust drops instantly for devices in the event of
attacks. Thus, the time to detection is much less and thus the impact of cyber-attacks is much less.
The third benefit is that our framework is able to handle uncertainty in observation (evidence)
and appropriately apply contextual factors that can adjust the effect of such uncertainty on the final
inference on the trust level of each device. Essentially, uncertainty means that certain mismatches
with an access control policy may be caused by benign changes, and they need to be accounted for
to diminish false alarms.
The fourth benefit is that we take an API and Service level view instead of a device-level
view [9]], while collecting the evidence that determines the trust scores. This is because devices
can offer various services over time and their behavioral nature changes with time. If a device
is using more APIs or services (hence talks to more servers or other devices), its attack surface
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becomes larger compared to another devices that use a smaller set of services. Thus, the trust
model should be able to incorporate this aspect, which we do in our framework.
The framework is designed to be robust against intelligent strategies such as on-off (any attack
type that alternates between a period of attack versus no attack) and incremental ramp attack strategies (attack types where the attack volume in terms of bytes or packets is changed very slowly over
time).
Some of the other minor benefits include the following: Our trust model is designed such that it
is explainable rather than similar to research papers that apply a multitude of known ML techniques
without any explanation on how they work. Thus, it is difficult to know the conditions under which
they might fail. Additionally, unlike other research papers and frameworks in this area, we show
that the success of our method generalizes with minimal changes across multiple real-world smart
home datasets, containing data from various device manufacturers.
Furthermore, the trust scoring method is simple enough to be used by consumers who do not
have high technical knowledge. The consumers of a smart home can immediately block or disable certain devices/services according to the real-time trust scores at the FIoT that can be made
available to the end-user, instead of waiting for a service provider to declare a cyber-attack.

1.6 Organization of the Dissertation

The proposal is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses a general outline on the theories of
trust scoring models. The Chapter 3 reviews the literature on IoT device security for smart homes.
Chapter 4 presents a detailed smart home IoT system model and architecture. Chapter 5 presents
the threat landscape of smart home IoT devices. Chapter 6 proposes an evidence collection mech11

anism including access controls rules, a unified set of factors and feature mapping. Chapter 7
presents the Trust Scoring Model and Update mechanisms. Chapter 8 presents and discusses the
experimental design and corresponding results, and finally, Chapter 9 includes the conclusion and
future work.
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CHAPTER 2
TRUST IN AN IOT SYSTEM

2.1 Conceptual Foundations of Trust in Distributed Systems

The notion of trustworthiness in networks and distributed systems is viewed as a measure of reliability against a particular entity based on the nature of interactions that take place between entities
[bhatt-pimrc11]. Based on trustworthiness which is often a numerical value, a number of filtering
decisions are taken to ensure robust performance in the presence of malicious, selfish and malfunctioning entities in a distributed system [bhatt-icc13]. In this dissertation, we will introduce the
concept of how interactions between entities can form the basis of evidence based on established
trustworthiness. We will describe the methods that are used to establish trustworthiness, and how
trust metrics are utilized for robust functioning of the system. We also will discuss ad-hoc wireless
networks as a proof of concept example which has seen a lot of research in trust models to establish
the foundational ideas behind building trust frameworks.
The original concept of trustworthiness has its origins in human society known and is known
as social trust, a qualitative way of saying whether a person is reliable based on previous or current
observations on their behavior (by you and by others in general). This idea has been extended into
the realm of distributed and computer networks where each of the network entities is analogous
to humans and interactions exist between them. This idea is the concept of mechanical or technological trust, which is a quantitative measure of trustworthiness for interactions between network
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entities. Although there is no universally accepted definition of trust, trust can be broadly viewed
as reliance or dependence on feedback by some monitoring mechanism or criterion, in order for
that entity or action to be performed.
The notion of trust is contextual, and its meaning varies according to the applications it is
associated with. Trust can be a probability of the users information being correct, or probability
of performing the required action correctly in the future based on previous observations, or an
indication of security status as a function of malicious/suspicious behavior captured in network
traffic. For example, in the media access layer, a quantitative value of trust may denote how fairly
or unfairly an entity accesses a shared medium via the concerned MAC protocol. If a device is
controlled by a selfish user trying to access more resources unfairly (either in time or space) than
allowed by the MAC protocol, then a trust-based detection should reflect a low trustworthiness of
such selfish entities within the network as compared to others. Such trust scores can be a filtering
criterion for further participation in the MAC protocol. Therefore, trust scoring almost always is
followed by a classification step as an application or use case of trust scoring models.
If a device is maliciously preventing adequate resource access (contributing to a denial of service), then trustworthiness should reflect this action. At the network layer in wireless ad-hoc
networks, the proper forwarding of packets is an issue where trustworthiness is a measure of the
probability of the entity in the next step on the routing path to truthfully forward the packet. We
will provide a concrete example of interactions in the next section.

2.1.1

Trust Types

Trust in networked and distributed systems may be of two main types :
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• Direct trust: The value is a result of an independent or local trust evaluation, between two
immediate nodes based on observations of the local environment.
• Indirect trust: The value is based on combining feedback from multiple sources or using
advice from other nodes not in the immediate local neighborhood.
Trust can also be categorized into two types concerning the source of evidence [10]:

1. Personal trust: Trustor has direct experiences with a trustee. The trustee is trusted because
the trustor has had good experience with this person. The trustor expects the same behavior
from the trustee.
2. Interpersonal trust: Trustor has no direct experiences with a trustee. An example of interpersonal trust is having trust without necessarily having any direct experience of the trustee
(but perhaps trusting them because they are a part of some normative institution or because
others have good experiences with them and recommend them).

In ad-hoc networks, packet forwarding anomalies are used to establish trustworthiness in adhoc routing actions. In E-commerce, there are reputation and rating systems based on feedback.
A measure of how well an entity is expected to perform in future interactions is quantified when
the posteriori probability is calculated based on the feedback ratings that serve as evidence. In
cognitive radio networks, the routing issues and spectrum sensing reliabilities of binary advertised
information on spectrum availability is a significant security issue.
In the following sections, we will explore the basic concepts related to trust modeling, how
trust evidence is modeled from interactions that are local between two entities, how such pieces
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of evidence are mapped in numerical values of trust, and how such trust scores are applied or the
information that these trust values reveal. Then we look at research advancements in trust and
security issues.
In any networked or distributed system, there are the following three stages that generally
constitute a trust framework:

• Monitoring for Evidence The process of observing activities of the entities in the IoT network [11].
• Evidence to Trust Score Mapping is used to ensure the trustworthiness of a framework
model [12].
• Trust Update and Management Trust is dynamic and the trust value changes depending on
the entitys behavior.

2.2 Basic Tenets of Trust Framework Design

Below we describe the typical background knowledge that is used to design trust frameworks in
cyber information systems.

2.2.1

Trust Evidence Phase

The prior observations count events that happen in various categoryof possible interactions and
are typically used for arriving at a numerical trust value of an entity or an action. For example,
in the event of packet forwarding, a successful forwarding or an anomaly in packet forwarding
(mainly packet dropped due to malicious or selfish reasons), is an observation that can viewed
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as a success or failure based on whether the packet was successfully received over that node/link
or not. After a period, the number of success and failures in packet forwarding or observations
counts are accumulated. This is referred to as trust evidence. Based on these observation counts,
the quantitative values of trust are laid down by a trust model which takes evidence as an input.
Although there are various techniques of arriving at such observation counts, there are two basic
approaches that are popularly used. They are:

• Binomial case: In the binomial case, there are only two outcomes of monitoring an event
in a given category. Events are either deemed as a failure or success, a mismatch or mismatch, good or bad or positive and negative. There are only two observation parameters. A
popular technique is the beta distribution model which maps binomial trust evidence into a
quantitative value of trust. We discuss beta distribution in later sections.
• Multinomial Case: In the multinomial case, there are more than two outcomes for monitoring an event in the system. For example failure success and no result, match mismatch or
undecided, good bad and average, positive, negative or neutral etc. A popular technique that
models such evidence for multinomial cases is Dirichlet distribution which we will discuss
in a later subsection.

Whatever the technique to monitor interactions or events, the key is to devise a mechanism that
captures the behavior in the form of observation counts such that they can be modeled as trust
evidence which will ultimately lead to the quantitative trust value. The above is a general approach
of papers related to the literature on achieving trustworthiness in networks.
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2.2.2

Trust Scoring Phase

For beta distribution, the final value is usually representing a posteriori probability of a binary
event. The beta distribution has two parameters φ and κ, which are usually dependent on observation counts.

f (p|φ, κ) =

Γ(φ + κ) (φ−1)
p
(1 − p)κ−1
Γ(φ)Γ(κ)

(2.1)

where p is the probability of observing an outcome of the category φ.If we are interested in the
expected value of successful or positive behavior in future events, the trustworthiness is calculated
by the following:

φ
φ+κ

(2.2)

Like for example, in [13], α and β are denoted as the number of success and failures respectively in a packet forwarding problem. The number of successes gives the notion of an action
which contributes to the gain in trustworthiness. We see that such methods are not appropriate for
application in IoT cyber-attacks, although this forms a good starting point, as seen in chapter 7.

2.2.3

Trust Management and Update Phase

The trust scoring model gives an instantaneous value of trust for a particular event in a given
temporal granularity of observation. Often the trust of an entity is updated by using a decay factor
ρ where more weight is given to newer interactions and reduced weight to lower ratings. This
process is similar to the method prevalent in internet RTT measurement. Such decaying factor
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help nodes that might have lost trustworthiness due to noise in environment or network conditions
like multipath fading etc. to regain the trust when conditions improve. It also reflects nodes that
were selfish at the start but gradually started to cooperate or vice versa. There is a myriad of ways
to update trust. One such way is
∑N −1

Ei =

N −1−j
αji
j=0 ρi
∑N −1 N −1−j
(αji + βji )
j=0 ρi

(2.3)

where
N = total number of monitored events/behavior
i = a particular node or entity in the network
j = a number representing the j − th event in the event space
ρi = a decay factor usually in the range 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1
αji = is the j − th positive behavior of node i in the event space
βji = is the j − th negative behavior of node i in the event space. However, we will later see that
for security this is not the best approach and, thus we need novel ways of trust management and an
update that counters smart attack strategies from real cyber-attacks.

2.2.4

Trust Propagation

In many cases, there is a requirement of trust propagation in the network. Indirect trust is combining feedbacks from multiple sources to have a total trust map of the network. This is important
when one node needs to know the entire trust map in the absence of a centralized authority. It is
common in ad-hoc networks where there is no central authority, but the trust map is required for
end to end operations between nodes in the network (like for example routing). For trust propaga19

tion, there are a few axioms that should be preserved. Firstly, since information is not increased
through propagation, trust propagation should not increase, so trust can either remain the same or
decrease. Secondly, multiple paths for indirect trusts should yield the same results. Thirdly, no
matter how many observations there are, there should be a way to normalize trust values. However, trust propagation is not always a necessity and depends on the category or context of trust
management. For example, in cognitive radio ad-hoc networks, in the context of secure cooperative spectrum sensing only, the neighbor nodes from which spectrum advertisements are relevant
is required, so for any node, it is sufficient to know the trust values of those nodes in its immediate neighborhood, with which it has direct interaction. This dissertation does not deal with trust
propagation since we are focused on decentralized trust models that focus on the individual smart
home network.

2.2.5

Trust Characteristics

Trust characteristics and the main properties of trust can be summarized as follows [14, 15]:

1. Degrees of trust: in general, trust is not represented as a binary value (i.e., 1 = trusted, 0 =
untrusted); instead trust is described as a set of values, a degree (i.e., I trust Ahmad 40% to
drive my motorbike), between 0 and 1, -1 to 1.
2. Trust is asymmetric: i.e., I trust Mike more than Mike trusts me. Node A with the higher
capability (i.e., more energy or computational power) may not trust node B with a lower
ability at the same level that node B trusts node A [15].
3. Trust is bidirectional: for two entities, there are two trust relationships in two directions:
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Entity A trusts to some degree Entity B and Entity B trust to some (other) degree entity A.
4. Trust is adaptive: value of the trust should change depending on the service itself, the service
provider, and the service requester.
5. Trust is dynamic: it applies only in a given period and changes as time goes on [16]. In
mobile environments, trust information is typically incomplete and can change rapidly due
to node mobility, so building trust in such environments is temporally and spatially local
information [17]. Capturing the dynamics of trust should be expressed as a continuous
variable not as a binary, or even discrete-valued entity [15].
6. Trust is context-dependent: trust applies only in a given context. Thus, the degree of trust in
different contexts is different [16]. Various types of trust are required depending on the given
task (i.e., trust in the computational power of a laptop, or trust in unselfishness of another
cell phone operator, or trust in forwarding versus trust in reporting) [15].
7. Trust is not transitive: : in general, trust is not transitive but may be transitive within a given
context [16]. ]. If I trust you, and you trust somebody, it does not guarantee that I trust him.
In particular, the transitivity of trust between two entities to a Trusted Third Party (TTP)
requires two types of trust: (i) trust in a trustee, and (ii) trust in the trustees recommendation
of the Trusted Third Party [15].
8. Trust is subjective: A trustor node can determine different levels of trust for the same trustee
node due to different experiences, i.e., ones derived from a dynamically changing network
topology.
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9. Trust is a function of uncertainty: the node performs unsure activities due to ambiguity and
the lack of resources or references, so it is not crystal clear that the action performed is
honest, an example of that in an IoT network is IP forwarding.

2.2.6

Trust Information Resources

The primary resources for information evaluations of trust are:
1. Direct Interaction and Observation (DI), rust is based on an entitys behavior.
2. Recommendation, sometimes referred to as indirect trust. In the case of entities unknown
to another entity, recommendations for these entities might be provided by a Trusted Third
Party (TTP), so the entity has information about the trustworthiness of these unknown entities [10].
3. Reputation,is an aggregation of recommendations about a given third party. Reputation is
affected by this partys past behavior and a good indication of the future action of an entity.
Reputation is not like trustworthiness since it does not necessarily need to include data about
direct interactions between the trustor and trustee [10].
According to Josang reputation is closely linked to the concept of trust with two differences [18]:
-I trust you because of your good reputation;
-I trust you despite your bad reputation.
Reputation is used in case of the absence of a Direct Interaction (DI) or Recommendation. It
is affected by an entitys past behavior and considered a good indication of the future behavior of
the entity. Clearly, in any trust calculation, DI affects trust more than a recommendation (indirect
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interaction). Recommendation is vital in cases where no DI is available. The three common ways
to establish trust are: [19]

1. Policy-based trust: Policies determine accurately the conditions necessary to obtain trust and
can predetermine the actions and outcomes depending on whether certain conditions are met
or not. Using policies to establish trust is based on managing and exchanging credentials and
enforcing access policies. Credentials are information issued by one entity that may describe
the features or qualities of another entity. In general, policy-based trust assumes that trust
established by obtaining a sufficient amount of credentials related to a specific entity and
applying particular policies give that entity access rights.
2. Reputation-based trust: is an assessment based on the history of observed interactions of an
entity. This assessment can be done either directly with the evaluator (subjective experience)
or as reported by others (recommendations or third-party verification). Reputation-based
trust computes trust value using the history of an entitys actions or behavior and may use a
referral-based trust.
3. Referral-based trust: is based on recommendations (information from others) to build trust
in an entity. The referral-based approach is needed in the absence of (or in addition to)
first-hand knowledge.

2.2.7

Trust properties

Trust metrics usually have the following properties:
Reflexive:T (A1, A1,100), each entity completely trusts itself .
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Mutual Trust: in each environment, all entities trust each other depending on the TV, where
device A1 has trust TV showing the level of trust for device A2 T(A1, A2, TV).
Partially Transitive: if A trusts B and B trusts C then A Trusts C in a different TV, so T(A, B,
T Vx ) and T(B, C, T Vy ) → T (A, C, T Vz ).
Service dependent: trust value is dependent on services, the entity A may trust B for service
X, while it may not trust it for service Y.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is discusses some significant works that highlight the security landscape of IoT devices, the trust in IoT system, and the trust middlewares in IoT system. Below a list of examples
of IoT security middleware requirements are provided apart from middleware architecture model
platforms that support security, trust, and privacy (such as OAuth2, Attribute-Based Access Control ABAC, QoC, eXtensible Access Control Markup Language XACML, Attestation, Trusted
Platform Module TPM, Transport Layer Security TLS) and support IoT specific protocols (such as
MQTT, CoAP, DDS, Bluetooth or Zigbee):

3.1 Security in IoT

A significant security research on CoAP and MQQT found that, the CoAP is more efficient in
terms of power consumption (Lev [20]) that is a critical component of all IoT systems. Also,
their experiment results show the efficiency of using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
with EXI (Efficient Extensible Interchange) library instead of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
in terms of power consumption. We would like to mention another comparison study between
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and TLS. Our study shows that MQQT uses less
power than HTTP over TLS in many scenarios. Additionally, the result of a comparison study of
network traffic between CoAP and MQTT shows similar overall performance in terms of network
traffic [21]. Another significant research that motivated us in our research are:
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A SoK paper proposed a fingerprint for devices component to provide consumer report evaluation for each IoT device by security analysis for SH IoT devices platform [8]. Another study
focused on attack specific defenses such as Dolphin Attack, an Inaudible Voice Commands and
Skill Squatting on Amazon Alexa [6, 7]. SORTERIA method proposed as automated analysis IoT
security and safety [22]. Also, another security study proposed Rethinking that use access control
and authentication for secure SH [23].
Finally, Yi proposed a cryptographic system that does not depend on a single central certificate authority (CA) [24]. This approach requires human validation and intervention, and this
causes security challenges (i.e., a human may forget to install a significant security update) and
decreases automation, thus affecting the usability of IoT devices. We found that all these methods
did not propose trust scoring middleware. Therefore, we propose FIoT and TIoT a trust scoring
middleware approach as more feasible solution that ameliorates the above unique challenges in
IoT system and provide TV that showing IoT device malicious behavior in easy way that can be
understand by any knowledge level user without asking SH user to go and read scientific paper to
know the security of IoT devices .

3.2 Trust in IoT

Ensuring trust between IoT entities, and owners, and service providers is a challenge. There are
many models or protocols presented to adopt trust in IoT system. Some models or rules address
the security, trust and privacy vulnerability. This section is to categorize IoT models based on trust.
A Trust-based Access Control TRAC: is a trust-based architecture for security and privacy in
the intelligent environment (IE) [25] based on prior user information. The authors use trust-based
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access control for ensuring security and privacy. The proposed model is a policy-based model that
allows users to define policies for themselves. Thus, it gives users control to determine their security level. This model works in an intelligent environment, because each user is known beforehand.
However, in a true IoT smart home system, it is not possible to have prior information about every
user and thus, this model is not applicable.
Trust-based Secure Service Discovery model(TSSD): The design of TSSD facilitates service
lookup and efficient information dissemination [26]. The TSSD ensures the privacy of users. The
authors implement a trust-based risk and trust-based security model. Efficiency is achieved by
interleaving/switching between secure and non-secure modes of operation for service provider selection and service lookup, respectively based on resource constraints. The TSSD is implemented
to provide a trust-based security model that works in everyday situations without compromising
the performance of the entities. TSSD design is simple but efficient: takes care of security-related
problems without causing much battery power consumption; that is why it is good for the IoT
environment.
Also, TSSD is a hybrid model that operates both insecure and non-secure mode depending on
the level of security needs for the service. Therefore, implementing a hybrid mode minimizes the
overhead of encrypting messages each time a device requests or provides services. Building a trust
relationship is difficult if no information about trustor is available. A risk model analysis was also
developed to address situations like this and to report the risk of sharing services.
Attribute Vector Calculus (AVCM): is the approach for modelling trust-based security and privacy [27]. AVCM is one of the first models that discuss the importance of trust in the IoT environment. Their model describes both identity-based trust and context-based trust. This model is a
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straightforward one, fails to address complex situations where assigning trust is not sufficient for
ensuring security.
Splendor: is a service protocol for secure, private, and location-aware IoT systems. This approach considers environmental variables in which the client-service model depends on the environment [28]. Also, it is supported location-awareness and uses a combination of public-key and
symmetric key for security. The presented security model is based on mutual authentication. Table
3.1 presents a comparison of some trust-based security and trust-based privacy models.
Table 3.1: Comparison of different solutions
Solution
Splendour
AVCM
TRAC
SOK
TSSD
MUD

Infrastructure Support
Needed
Yes
No
N/A
Yes
No
Yes

Light-weight

Trust-based

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

3.3 IoT Middleware

This section summarizes a study of a variety of IoT middleware. Providing a simple analysis of
whether the surveyed systems have any support for trust, security, and privacy. The middleware in
IoT system is categorized to:

• Platform middleware: an application running, resources management, and Application Programming Interface (API)).
• Communication middleware: supporting protocols, and message delivery.
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• Data Management Middleware: database, and distributed file [29].
We propose a Fog Internet of Things (FIoT) as a trust scoring middleware for smart home
IoT system. FIoT detects breaches of security and privacy services in IoT middleware layer and
provide it with minimum overhead for IoT device operations. Due to the limitation of some IoT
entities, applying all security and privacy services will reduce device performance because that
require entities to use high computation processes and memory capacity.
The security in IoT middleware was not mentioned in the survey by Bandyopadhyay [30, 31].
While, IoT middleware that supports security, privacy, and trust without presenting the requirement
was presented by [32].
1. CHOReOS: it is a collection of software models to support large-scale Web Service choreographies on IoT environment presented by [33]. CHOReOS is an open source middleware
that supports event-based, real-time, service oriented and component-based architecture design. It supports cloud computing by providing a higher-level abstraction and services for
secure, scalable IoT system.
2. CoMiHoc: it is for MANET environments presented by [34]. It is used for location awareness and estimates the contexts of connection. For managing the context in a MANET
environment needs to address challenges such as (context uncertainty and fault tolerance).
3. Device cloud: Applying the concept of cloud computing to IoT middleware, presented by [35,
36], researchers in Technische Universitat Berlin. The security model for device cloud middleware support OAuth2.0, encryption and access control without supporting consent-bases
access control.
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4. FI-WARE: is an open-source middleware provide application Programming Interfaces APIs
and supported by tools such as (FIWARE Lab, FIWARE Acceleration, FIWARE Mundus,
FIWARE iHubs). FI-WARE is based-on-design privacy middleware model for secure exchange identity with other systems. FI-WARE implements through Generic Enablers Identity Management, policy decision point, policy enforcement point proxy based on OAuth2
and XACML identity. FI-WARE middleware is supporting IoT devices management and
discovery. The IoT devices are connected to the gateway, which is a part of IoT Edge [37,
38].
5. IFCIoT: Integrated Fog Cloud IoT (IFCIoT) fog computing middleware offers good performance for applications that requires fast processing by reducing the amount of data sent to
cloud for solving the limited bandwidth problem [39].
6. INCOME: This work [40], presented a high-level set of contexts in IoT system that can help
for trust decision, by integrating trust as a part of the quality level of a context. Later, Lim
et. al. built a framework on top of INCOME that supports Attribute Based Access Control
(ABAC) and Quality of Context (QoC) [41].
7. LinkSmart: it is an open source IoT middleware support service-oriented, centralized, realtime and semantic architecture design. LinkSmart supports dynamic reconfiguration, and
self-management based on the object and provides domain-specific services. LinkSmart
developed by a European R& D Team, HYDRA middleware for Networked Embedded Systems NES is the old name of LinkSmart. It uses a low-level Data Acquisition Component
for data collecting, and IoT services (i.e., device abstraction, security, data management,
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machine learning, etc.). LinkSmart provides security and trust by allows secure, trustworthy
and fault-tolerance application [42].
8. NOS: presented by Sicari of using machine learning model to analyses and adjust the reputation value for entities in IoT systems. NOS is entities behaviors-based middleware using
keys and key-based authentication, encryption and complex passwords services [43, 44].
9. OpenIoT: it is an open source IoT middleware with semantic, event-based, and serviceoriented architecture design for IoT services in the cloud. OpenIoT presented and developed
by the European Union FP7 program fund research [45]. It applies the Semantic Sensor
Network (SSN) for semantic unification IoT system. It uses publish-subscribe for collecting
data from IoT entities, and use eXtended Global Sensor Network X-GSN for interact with
cloud database. The security and privacy are supported using OAuth2 for central authentication and authorization. It also supported tools for enabling IoT application such as Integrated
Development Environment (IDE).
10. Relayr: it is an enterprise IoT middleware support end to end device management, security,
and data analytics. Relayr middleware supports IoT system in management and collects data
from millions of things in a fog domain; provides device health monitoring performance and
configuration; discover resources; visualization; maintenance and update firmware; privacy
and security; data process and analysis [46].
11. ubiSOAP: it is SOAP-based standard middleware based on service-oriented IoT application.
ubiSOAP does not integrate with cloud computing [47, 48]
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12. UPnP: IoT middleware for mesh home network presented by Gashti [49]. UPnP IoT middleware is supports: client-server; node-based and centralized architecture design; provides the
P2P connection. UPnP does not support sufficient context-awareness while can store user
profile and context in an intermediate node.
13. VIRTUS: presented by Bazzani [50] as a secure IoT middleware for e-health application service (collecting patient data, monitoring, tracking, identification, etc.), VIRTUS middleware
support real-time and event-based architecture design. VIRTUS is based on Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) to provide: real-time; safe access control; trustworthy
communication tunnel over TLS; and a SASL for authentication among heterogeneous devices. SASL is supported token-based approaches such as OAuth2, X.509, or Kerberos for
secure communication between servers for full server federation.
14. WIBINOS: presented by Desruelle [51], by use of policy-based access control modelled in
the XACML and support OAuth2 for authentication. WIBINOS is supporting the concept of
the device under the control of the user where each user has cloud instance called Personal
Zone Hub (PZH). PZH acts as a certificate authority to control his zone. PZH issuing device certificates used for mutual authentication using TLS. OpenID protocol is used for user
authentication and utilized Personal Zone Proxy (PZP) for communication. WIBINOS used
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware to support attestation for report software modification because TPM allows recovering attestation data. Fig 3.1 presents a comparison of
different instances of secure IoT middleware.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of different instances of secure IoT middleware
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CHAPTER 4
SMART HOME MIDDLEWARE ARCHITECTURE

In this chapter, our goal is to first understand the smart home’s network’s general architecture
and operations. First, we introduce several pieces of network hardware components that help us
understand the smart home network’s architecture. The network components include: (1) IoT
devices (low computation devices), (2) non-IoT (high computation) devices, (3) IoT hub device,
(4) smart home gateway (fog node), and the (5) cloud gateway (cloud node). Our first section will
describe the details of all the network components (hardware). Second, we provide details of how
communication happens among various network components to offer smart home services.
The second section explains our communication architecture and IoT device operations, which
is key to collecting evidence in the correct manner, such that calculation of trust scores capable of
indicating the security status of an IoT device with high fidelity in real time is made possible. The
smart home gateway acts as a fog node which hosts our trust FIoT middle ware (for smart home
specific monitoring), while the cloud gateway is the corresponding cloud node that hosts the TIoT
middleware (for community wide monitoring of multiple smart homes) that can communicate.
This can be understood from Fig. 4.1.
The third section discusses some of the assumptions we make which defines the scope of applicability of our proposed framework.
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Figure 4.1: Smart Home workflow
4.1 Network Components

A typical smart home contains various types of devices. Therefore, it is important to clearly delineate what classifies as IoT devices and which ones are non-IoT devices as shown in Fig. 4.2. This
helps to establish the scope of the research.

4.1.1

Low computation devices IP enabled Devices (IoT)

An IoT device is an IP-enabled device that offers certain services, such as smart surveillance,
smart speaker, etc. Each of these IP enabled devices has a corresponding API (or simply app.) and
a firmware that helps to provide the required SH services.
There are three types of IoT devices in the smart home based on how they connect to the rest
of the internet and how that IoT device offers each service to the smart owner. Each ‘IoT device’
provides certain ‘services’ to the SH owner, through the help of some ‘apps’ or ‘APIs’. These APIs
or simply apps. are used to provide services in the two following ways:
Type I (Exogenous): IoT device’s app is installed on the SH owners personal high computation
devices such as laptop/smartphone/tablet rather than on the IoT device themselves. For example, a
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surveillance camera ‘service’ is provided by either one or more cameras (IoT devices), which the
SH owner can access through a ‘camera app’ (e.g., Samsung Cam App) and/or a generic Smart
Home app (e.g., Google Home app.) that are installed in the SH owner’s smartphone/laptop.
Type II (In-Situ): IoT device use embedded software apps installed on its own OS/kernel/firmware,
to provide its services, without the involvement of SH owner’s personal high compute devices. For
example, Apple TV, Honeywell thermostats. have their firmware that connects through the insitu APIs to the IoT service provider, without the involvement of apps installed on SH owners
laptops/smartphones.
Type III (IoT Hub): IoT Hub is a device that acts as a central message hub for bi-directional
communication between your IoT service provider’s middleware, in the cloud/fog/edge and the
IoT devices it manages. For example, IoT hub also called home automation hub, an example of
SH hub is Samsung Smart-Things Hub.

Figure 4.2: IoT device types

4.1.2

High computation IP devices (non-IoT)

These are devices that host apps/APIs that allow the use of the IoT services offered by IoT devices.
Examples of such high computation IP devices include smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktop, and
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etc. This device is designed for multi-purposes that can install on the OS many apps and software.
Depending on the application, the smart homeowner often needs to use a specific app installed
on a high compute personal device (e. g., smartphone, laptop, tablet) to request/response/command
services via the fog node, if she is using SH network (i. e., inside the home). In contrast, if the SH
owner is outside her SH network, she connects through a VPN to the cloud TIoT middleware. This
process is following the recommendation of the USA Department of Justice [52]. As a result, all
the SH services are provided to the SH user, via a fog or a cloud middleware depending on whether
they are within or outside their homes.

4.1.3

No Computation Non IP enabled Devices

All other sensors and actuators that are not enabled by an IP address, but collect data and perform
actions, are not considered as IoT devices. These can act according to or provide information to
IoT devices, but in this thesis we are only concerned with specific vulnerabilities of IoT devices
that lead to security threats.

4.1.4

Smart Home (Fog) Gateway (SHG)

Each smart home has a gateway router (SHG) that connects, the IoT devices to the rest of the
internet. The smart home gateway router has a data plane and a control plane. The control plane
supports services such as Network Address Translation (NAT), Routing protocols, DHCP, and
switch management.
On the other hand, the data plane is supposed to forwarding packets from input network interfaces to the appropriate output network interface as directed by the control plane. Our proposed
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trust model will be deployed on the smart home gateway router (SHG), as a part of the FIoT middleware on the data plane as elaborated later. This is specifically, because all packets that pass
through a given network node, use the data plane. Thus, the FIoT middleware as an additional part
of the data plane will be able to monitor the IoT device activities by inspecting outgoing packets
from the corresponding smart home. The SDN controller on the SHG coordinates with the cloud
gateway’s to pass necessary smart home specific information for community-wide monitoring of
smart homes.
The FIoT components include a modem, a optional firewall device, and the smart home router
(the gateway), the management switch, and fog storage.
The router is connected to the management switch and the fog storage. The management
switch supports SDN to program the network traffic, while the fog storage is used for backup and
reduction of bandwidth and latency within the SH network and the cloud TIoT.
All FIoT components are not IoT devices and supported with all necessary traditional security
services and mechanisms, which is beyond the scope of this research.
The SHG connected to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and other networks via a firewall
device. The firewall is the first security and protection layer of FIoT. The second security layer for
FIoT is the management switch that uses to assign a VLAN for each group of IoT devices based on
device data sensitivity and assign static IP for each IoT device. Using VLAN will increase SH security by providing network segmentation that meets with the recommendation of the Department
of Justice [52]. The third security layer is TIoT that used to monitor the performance of FIoT on
the cloud.
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4.1.5

Cloud Gateway

The SHG router (fog node) is managed by another SDN controller hosted on the cloud, that implements a TIoT middleware. Each FIoT middleware instance coordinates with a cloud Trust IoT
(TIoT) Service Middleware for providing our trust services to multiple homes and performing
prediction using machine learning.
The TIoT is responsible for the management and analysis of multi FIoT nodes, as shown in
Fig 4.3. The TIoT will provide a comprehensive community-scale view of the attack activities
by correlating statistics of various attack types, time of the attack, region of attack, frequency of
attack, the size of attack (number of attacked smart homes). Thus, this can be effective in finding
coordinated multi smart home attacks in time window T , inspect whether there is a pattern in the
kind of IoT devices that are targeted by an attacker, and attribute them to the same adversary.

Figure 4.3: TIoT and FIoT model design
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4.2 IoT Device Operations
Each IoT device i is running one or more IP based services, such that i ∈ {1, 2, .., I}, where I is
the total number of IoT devices in the smart home.
Moreover, each IoT device i, provides a set of services with the help of one (or more) apps.
The set of services is represented by the set S (i) ∈ {1, · · · , k, · · · , K (i) }, and the set of apps is
(i)

represented by A(i) ∈ {1, · · · , j, · · · , Nj }, where k and j denote an given service and an app
(i)

respectively, and K (i) and Nj are total number of services offered by the i-th IoT device. In most
cases, IoT devices have a single app, that provides multiple services. Therefore, the set of services
offered by a home is

I
∪

S (i) .

i=1

Figure 4.4: FIoT nodes hierarchy in the SH
A general case is shown in Fig. 4.4. Since our method works, independently for device-level
flows i, we drop the notation i for notational simplicity. In a smart home some ’services’ are
provided by using more than a single IoT device. Similarly, the smart home services provided by
an IoT device may use by more than one IoT device. Successful execution of service may involve
one or more IoT devices in the smart home. For example, the surveillance camera service may
involve multiple cameras at a different location in a smart home, whereas the smart refrigerator
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services use only one IoT device, namely the smart fridge.
Clearly each service is an application that runs on remote (or in-home) servers. The apps. help
the IoT devices to connect to those servers servers that host the specific service. Each of these
servers will have an IP address and each service is usually offered through a known port no. on
these servers. Naturally, it is clear that for each IoT device i, there will be a set of IPs and port
numbers that will represent the set of services offered to a device i. Thus, in short we visualize
S (i) is a 2 tuple list containing the IPs and port no. of the service offered by the device i to the SH
owner. For disambiguation of terminology, we specifically refer to the IPs, and port no.s in S (i) , as
destination IP and destination port no. The list of notation is presented on Table. 4.1.

Table 4.1: Notations
Symbol
i
k
K (i)
j
(i)
Nj
Js
Jd
c
AS

4.2.1

Meaning
IoT device ID i
Service ID k
Total number of services supported
Any API j supported by device i
Number of APIs per device
Source Port Number
Destination Port Number
Connection Status
Access Control Flag

Assumptions

1. FIoT in our model represents a single smart home. In an alternative approach if there are
multi SH in the same neighborhood (a group of SHs). The SH could include not only the
edge domain but also a fog node. The part of the fog domain within SH would be called
local fog and the other part of the fog outside SH would have called remote fog that connects
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to cloud TIoT. This alternative approach would reduce the traffic between SH and remote
fog, and the cloud.
2. This dissertation intends to detect misbehavior of the app/firmware of smart home IoT devices that connect via smart home WiFi network by using fog gateway router. All SH network devices should register first in FIoT and having a static IP that managed by the FIoT at
the fog gateway router.
3. Any packet exchanged between an IoT device and its corresponding server (for any given
service) passes through our FIoT middleware.
4. FIoT cannot detect the leakage caused by the non-IoT based applications installed on the
high computing devices of the smart homeowner. Also, we cannot detect the misbehavior of
IoT devices that connect directly to the 5G or 4G network or uses a non WiFi network for
communication.
5. In the suggested SH system, we assume that all processing is done in Fog. There is no
processing in edge domain; instead, packets are sent to fog domain FIoT for calculation TV
and no TV calculation in cloud TIoT.
6. In general, even a laptop can be an edge device. However, we assume that edge devices for
SH are low computation power IoT devices.
7. we assume that FIoT middleware is both fog and edge (a single SH) in the same time it
uses for calculate TV in the smart home, and TIoT service is running in the cloud domain
middleware.
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4.3 Research Scope and Limitations

The research scope and limited to the following:

1. the proposed trust scoring middleware is to calculate trust values for only devices that we
considered it as IoT devices in this research.
2. We limit our investigation to the trust of the IoT devices in the SH. Other threats are outside
of the scope of this research, such as investigating the trust, security and privacy threats for
non-IoT device or non SH devices are outside of the dissertation scope.
3. Evaluate the feasibility of Fog Trusted Internet of Things (FIoT) system
4. Communication security among SH nodes is out of the scope of this dissertation.
5. Entities security among SH nodes is out of the scope of this dissertation.
6. We do not consider all IoT entities in this research, but only the SH entities that used in this
research.
7. We do not consider embedded trust; chain of trust; Authenticated Code Module (ACM);
Social Trust; and Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
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CHAPTER 5
THREAT MODEL

5.1 Adversary Types

We visualize the different categories of adversaries as external or internal. External adversaries
are actors such as organized cybercriminals and business rivals of IoT service providers, while the
internal adversary is an IoT service provider or the manufacturer itself.
External Adversaries: Specifically, external adversaries are those who are authorized entities.
Furthermore, these entities either attack and cripple IoT devices on the SH network (Direct attacks)
or compromise IoT devices as a resource to launch cyber-attacks on other devices within and
outside the SH network (Reflection attacks).
External attackers are actors such as organized cybercriminals and business rivals of SH IoT
service providers. As we will see later, when the target of external adversaries is the IoT devices
themselves, it is known as a ’direct’ attack, while if the IoT device is an agent that is used as a
weapon to launch attacks on other machines on the internet, it is known as a ‘reflection’ attack.
Internal Adversaries: : In contrast, internal adversaries are actors who are part of an IoT
service provider or someone who behaves as one in the background without the explicit knowledge
of the SH owner. Internal adversaries are related to all kinds of privacy and confidentiality leakage
based attacks. In general, internal adversaries are hard to distinguish from purely access control
list-based approaches.
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One or more of these three possible scenarios are possible:
Inside-Outside (IO) scenario: In this scenario, the attacker uses a ‘reflection’ attack type to
target smart devices from several homes, using it later to launch an attack from inside (I) smart
homes to target victim servers outside the smart home (O). i.e., DDOS reflection.
Inside-Inside (II) scenario: In this scenario, the set of IoT devices inside the SH (I)are compromised by an adversary, and are used to launch an attack targeting the IoT and non IoT devices
within (inside I) inside (I) the SH. An example of the IO scenario is the ping of a death attack
mostly targeting system availability.
Outside-Inside (OI) scenario: In this scenario, the attacker uses devices from outside the SH
(O) for targeting devices inside the SH (I). An example of that is a Mirai attack.

5.2 IoT Device Based Exploits

We categorize SH IoT devices into these two types:
Type (I): are IoT devices that need an app installed on a high computation device such as a
laptop, tablet, or a smartphone for offering the required services.
Type (II): devices do not need an app, and the firmware/OS is directly sending data to IoT hub
that is controlled by the IoT service provider without the involvement of a user high computation
device. Let us discuss the exploits or attack surface for each device type.
Type III: devices that connect using an IoT hub device, but work in a similar manner as type
II devices.
Type (I) Device Exploits: An external adversary can compromise an app/firmware remotely or
physically to perform unauthorized access to information, or unwarranted and covert leakage of
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information in the SH. For example, the attacker may harness a compromised app to access the
SH services that reveal private/confidential tracking activities or introduce spurious requests to the
IoT devices. In contrast, an internal adversary uses the original app that comes with the IoT device
to leak information to its developer or a third-party server covertly, by running in the background,
without the knowledge of the owner.
Type (II) Device Exploits: In this device category, which comes with firmware, the attacker could
be controlling the firmware directly in the following ways:
(i) External adversaries can steal information by compromising IoT hub sending data to specific
unauthorized server ports or continue sending data without permission.
(ii) The attacker can patch the IoT device firmware for leaking data provided by an IoT device
by sending data to an attacker server port.
(iii) The attacker connects an external malicious IoT device to the SH network.
(iv) The attacker disconnects the IoT device from the SH network, and connects it to the attacker network after spoofing the MAC and IP.

5.3 Categories of Attack

In general, the threats are on all security services (SSs) such as Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication, Access Control, Non-repudiation, and Notarization. This portion mentions
a brief explanation about some threats on IoT SSs listed on [53].
Confidentiality threats: Confidentiality threats is where the IoT devices in Smart homes SH
leak data to an external adversary,in other words, the data is available to an unauthorized device.
For example, an SH thermostat sends out home temperature data to the device belonging to an
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attacker other than its own SH server. Controlling confidentiality threats is done by using encryption and device authentication, but that will provide computation overhead and limitation in low
computation IoT devices. Thus, we propose the trust scoring model as an alternative protection
method.
Integrity threat: The attacker aims to change the destination or source of packet delivery. Integrity is ensuring the device communicates with the correct server, and the data received to its
intended destination without any modification. Thus, integrity attacks can threaten both payload
data and source/- destination data. In our framework, we are concerned with integrity attacks that
target the source/destination data in the packets. An example of an integrity threat is a worm
that spreads using ZigBee, Direct (Fraggle, DNS Spoofing, Ping of Death), and Reflection attack
(DDos, SNMP, SSDP [54]. Each of these attacks is explained later in greater detail. Our experiment results successfully detect integrity threats, as explained in the experiment result section.
Access control threats: The attacker takes advantage of the weaknesses in the access control
policies and mechanisms to compromise IoT devices. If the attacker successfully bypasses access
control policy, then SH user will be not the only person who has access to IoT devices, but also
the attackers will have access to the those IoT devices in an unauthorized manner. This access can
be used to disrupt other IoT devices or launch DDoS attacks on other servers on the internet [54].
Examples of access control threats include (i) Reflection based Buffer attacks, Replay attacks, Dos
attacks (attack entity), SMURF attacks. (ii) A direct attack is a password attack, for example.
Weak access control can allow an attacker to control the SH network or to turn the device down.
A weak access vulnerability example is a default login user name and password in some devices
such as routers, or webcams. The proposed trust middleware model FIoT is able to detect access
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control using registration and an access control list.
Availability threats: Such attacks on vulnerability cause failure in SH services by discontinuing device operation or interrupting data delivery to a destination. Availability is the property
of SH services being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity. An availability
attack is performed using both direct, or reflection attacks, such as all kinds of DoS and DDoS
attacks [55]. An example of an availability threat is that a SH attacker could make a device jam to
suspend services or to cause physical damage.

5.4 Attack Surface on SH IoT

All attacks can target either security services (SSs) or privacy services (PSs). The attacker aims
to threaten either one or more of the SSs and PSs such as confidentiality, integrity, availability,
authentication, access control, non-repudiation, and notarization. The implementation of security
and privacy services is used to protect security components. The term attack on security domain
refers to the things targeted by an attacker, that is classified under a given domain. The three attacks
on the security domain presented by [56]are an attack on the data domain, an attack on the entity
(device) domain, and an attack on the network domain. In this thesis, we propose attacks on five
security domains. The proposed attack on the security domains are an attack on the entity (device)
domain, and an attack on the network infrastructure domain, an attack on the OS domain, an attack
on the data domain, and an attack on the application domain as shown from base to top in Fig. 5.1.
All the proposed domains above should be ideally secure. The attacker can use one domain or
more to perform an attack. To prevent all five security domains from attack is a challenge due to
the limitations of IoT systems. In order to prevent security domains from an attack, the IoT system
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should guarantee: (i) secure device-device communication; (ii) secure device-gateway communication; (iii) secure gateway-gateway connection; and (iv) secure key renewal. Practically, this is
hard to achieve, especially with the limitations of the IoT system and attacker professionalism.
Thus, this presents the need for a trust scoring model middleware FIoT as a foundation of security
and privacy of IoT systems to secure security domains. Our framework mostly deals with network
and application security domains.

Figure 5.1: IoT attacker targeting security domains and control

This section presented an explanation of the proposed attack on security domains.
Attacks on IoT device (entity): The attacker directly controls IoT devices, and the SH owner
could lose the ability to access or control the IoT devices function. For example, a surveillance
camera could stop/start recording without its owners request, or a delay in starting or stopping
recording, or losing the ability to turn a lightbulb on or off.
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Attack on Network Domain: The security and privacy of SHs is related to both the SH network and service provider network. Nowadays, SH networks connected to the internet provide both
IoT services and non-IoT related services. The non-IoT services include email traffic, online video
games, and other services provided by non-IoT devices such as desktops, laptops, smartphones,
and tablets. Therefore, according to to [25], the IoT network is facing vulnerabilities and security
threats that are divided into either: (i) internal network threats such as password sniffing, Trojan
threats, and data tampering (ii) or xternal network threats such as DoS attack, APR spoofing, and
man in the middle (MITM) attacks.
The similarities in the different SH network topologies presents new security challenges because the attacker becomes more knowledgeable and professional. Thus, the attacker of the SH
network domain might expose data and sensitive information when the data are transmitting. The
attacker takes advantage of weak authorization mechanisms in some network application protocols
such as the MQQT and CoAP protocols to threaten privacy, authentication, availability, and confidentiality services. Thus, encryption is used to protect network confidentiality. However, in an IoT
system, there are many challenges to using encryption due to the limitation of IoT devices which
presents the need to use IoT friendly protocols such as MQTT, CoAP, and SOAP.
However, IoT friendly protocols also have a security vulnerability and difficulty in applying
network security approaches. For example, (i) Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)/HTTP is
a web network protocol that often has a significant problem in terms of data-intensity and power
consumption. (ii) MQTT and CoAP protocols are easy to expose and have a lack of a secure
configuration that makes them a target for DoS and Password sniffing attacks according to Avasts
report [57].This network challenge motivates us to propose a trust-based security and privacy mid-
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dleware and implement trust scoring model FIoT/TIoT. Especially with an increase in the demand
for using MQQT and CoAP in SH systems. In this section, we mention significant security research on CoAP and MQQT. CoAP is more efficient in terms of network power conception that,
based on research by Leva, Mazhelis, and Suomi [20].The experiment results show the efficiency
of using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) with the Efficient XML Interchange (EXI)
instead of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) in terms of power consumption. Also, we mention
another comparison study between Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and TLS. The
study showed that MQQT uses less power than HTTP over TLS in many scenarios. Also, the
result of a comparison study of network traffic between CoAP and MQTT, showed similar overall
performance in terms of network traffic [21].
Attacks on OS or firmware:IoT devices run with OS security vulnerabilities related to OS/firmware
security patches and updates. The attacker aims to take advantage of the lack of OS/firmware security patches and updates. According to Ciscos survey in 2016, 23% of vulnerabilities in IoT
devices are noticed after 5 or 6 years of service [58] due to this aspect. Clearly, proven by security
research, most OS/firmware security patches and updates are applied after the attacker had compromised OS/firmware for a long time. This is because the attacker takes advantage of software
bugs in the code until the OS/firmware developer or vendor discovers it and resolves it. Resolving
OS/Firmware bugs is done by publishing OS/firmware patches and updates and repeatedly doing
that each time an OS/firmware bug is detected. However, this is not very easy for IoT devices due
to the lack of a user interface and processing power that traditional cyber devices have.
Significant literature to control OS/firmware attacks proposed (i) eliminating known OS/firmware
vulnerabilities in OS design, (ii) using trusted execution, (iii) regular OS/firmware patch updates,
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the most popular and influential solution, but the most significant challenges are (i) the lack of
performing OS/firmware patch updates where most IoT devices are not up to date. (ii) most IoT
users do not perform OS/firmware patch updates because they do not trust the vendor due to an insider attack. These aspects make compromising IoT devices rather easy. For all the reasons above,
we propose a middleware trust scoring model to detect such activity by monitoring the outgoing
transmission size of each packet and access violation factors. The OS/firmware attack types are:
Insider attack: OS/firmware is programmed is such a way that it leaks private information to
the vendor or third party. An example of OS or firmware vulnerability is an insider attack when the
attacker is the vendor itself trying to collect user information for quality enhancement purposes or
to make this data available to a third party which is why some vendors sell IoT devices at a value
price because the real benefit is from collected data and this is a privacy issue. Leaking data may
occur in the background when the user uses the service or the IoT device to save leaked data and
send it at a specific time. An example is the FaceTime app for iPhone, which had a bug that caused
the video and microphone to turn on, even when the call was not answered.
External adversary:The attacker may use malware to patch IoT device OS/firmware for leaking private data to attacker servers or to a third party.
Attacks on Data: Attacks on data involve (i) leaking data, where the attacker can receive data
(confidentiality attack). (ii) modifying data, the attacker can modify data (integrity attack) such as
sending the wrong temperature information or increasing the temperature without owner permission. (iii) deny data, the attacker can delete data (availability attack).
Attack on Application: Traditional application and data security methods are not useful in IoT
systems due to the limitation of IoT entities. Attacking of applications is hard to detect due to high
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network traffic without FIoT. Layer7 attacks exhaust the resources of the victim by sending HTTPget requests such as HTTP flood attacks, thus, preventing an attack on the application domain by
proposing FIoT as a trust-by-design middleware that provides a trust value for each IoT device
app/firmware represented as an IP:port combination to ensure SH security and privacy. FIoT is
designed to detect IoT device misbehavior using low level network traffic bytes and bits per second
for each IP, so FIoT is not a specific protocol level detection method. FIoT supports all kinds of
protocols and detects all kinds of protocol attacks. For example, detection of the misbehavior of
devices that perform HTTP flooding attack are possible.

5.4.1

Privacy Leakage Attack

We view privacy leakage in three ways:
Constant Background Information Leakage: In such a case, there is a continuous stream of a
small amount of information in terms of outgoing transmissions that happen between the concerned
IoT device and its manufacturer and service provider or other devices that are part of the access
control list. An example of this is Google Home.
When the user agrees to a privacy agreement by default, he is authorizing Google Home for a
record conversation for service quality improvement, without awareness of SH user. Google Home
can record a conversation that it should never record, like a phone call and family conversation,
and such privacy leakage can expose a SH users confidentiality [37] This kind of privacy leaking
is related to the outgoing transition factor where a destination could be Google or a third party.
In future work, the proposed trust scoring model FIoT could detect privacy leakage by analyzing
the behavior of a devices outgoing packet size and time. An example of availability services with
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privacy-related leaking is an IoT device sending data to an attacker only instead of the authorized
user or server, or in case of a malicious app, access the SH service and kick-out the user app
from accessing services. In such a scenario, the attacker is also authentication, authorization and
availability services.
Also, to violate user privacy is an integrity services attack in cases when the IoT device provides
inaccurate data to the user, such as when the attacker changes the frame rate of a surveillance
camera and we can detect that by comparing the normal file size with a malicious one. Finally,
some privacy breaches impact non-repudiation services, where the attacker prevents an entity from
being involved in all or part of a communication, an example of that is when Google home mice
record a voice when it should be in sleep mode because in such case the user cannot deny recording.
Here the party connection time between the IoT devices and servers is higher.
Piggyback Information Leakage:In such a cases, there is no background information leakage.
However, whenever legitimate transmissions take place from an IoT device, the data that is part of
an information leakage is piggybacked over legitimate transmissions. In other words,, piggyback
information leakage is done by illicitly monitoring a SH IoT device and sending mirror data to a
vendor or third-party servers [56]. Such malicious activity can be detected by analyzing outgoing
transmission IP:port and number of packets and size in the time interval. The detection is based on
comparing the average file size with a malicious one.
Suspicious IP Forwarding: is a concept that is argued as a necessary means to support QoS
requirements by ensuring server availability and network load balancing. Therefore, IoT device
requests may be forwarded to servers other than the usual manufacturer and the service provider
servers. In such instances of FIoT and IoT port forwarding, the IoT device gets a response from
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another server that is not part of the access control list. However, this can be viewed as a potential
privacy threat since the SH owner is uncertain about the authenticity of this particular server. We
have found several examples of IP forwarding from the dataset [4] where such suspicious IP
forwarding behavior can be controlled using the proposed trust model FIoT by giving a weight to
uncertainty.

5.5 Attack Strength

IoT devices have a limited processing capability for network traffic. Some attacks would like to
keep a compromised device on service as much as possible to make the attack successful, so the
attacker keeps the traffic rate low. While another kind of attack such as a jamming attack is aimed
to make the IoT device non-functional, so the attacker keeps traffic rate high. Due to these two
kinds of attack behavior and to prove trust scoring accuracy and functionality, the trust model
FIoT was tested with both attack scenarios, and it successfully detects both types. FIoT was tested
with a data set obtained from [4, 5] that has internet and local attacks for various traffic rates: (i)
high attack traffic rate that generates 100 packets per second. (ii) medium attack traffic rate that
generates 10 packets per second, (iii) a low attack traffic rate that generates 1 packet per second.
Attack Strategies: In IoT system, the attacker usually performs an attack that impacts traffic
protocols such as ARP, TCP, UDP, ICMP and application layer protocols such as HTTP, HTTPS,
DNS, and SMTP.
The time of the attack for reaching maximum strength is based on the attack type and attacker
strategy (i. g., direct, reflection or amplification). After analyzing a network traffic flow .pcap
file, it can be observed that some attacks are light and have a low attack strength for longer than
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10 hours, while another devices have a high transmission that have a maximum attack strength
for a low attacking time interval like attacking for one hour or less. Because our trust model is
designed to detect hourly (per-hour) we found that some attacks are a type of on-off attack that
launch malicious activities only in the first hour and become honest for the next couple hours and
so on.
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CHAPTER 6
EVIDENCE COLLECTING FOR TRUST MODEL

6.1 FIOT Middleware Architecture

There are three important aspects of the FIOT middleware (1) Access control list (2) Deciding
Monitoring Factors (3) Feature design for device specific evidence building.

6.1.1

Access Control List Design

The first part is how to set up an access control list (ACL) that is different from traditional approaches. In this case, our effort is a query-based ACL, which includes not only the IoT devices
that are registered with the ACL in the FIoT, but also finding a mapping between IoT devices and
their corresponding server’s (that provide its service) destination port numbers, destination IPs,
their DNS names. For our proposed research, the ACL acts as a first protection layer amongst
other things, that help in collecting device-specific evidence from various device data flows corresponding to each service, although there are other non-ACL aspects of evidence collection. In
most typical cases, anything that does not match with an ACL is denied or deemed suspicious, thus
increasing false alarm rates, and decreased usability.
Our typical access control policy contains a database which has the following fields: Source
MAC, Source IP, Source Port Number, Connection Status, App No., Destination Port No., Destination IP, Service ID, Service Type.
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We would like to clarify that our definition of malicious activity is not device-centric since
the device is just physical hardware and cannot perform any services, without either the firmware
(OS) or its app. Therefore, an access control violation by an IoT device technically refers to
either its app(s) (installed off-site in a high computation personal devices) or the in-situ firmware
trying to access ‘unauthorized’ services, within the SH or on a remote server, because changes in
destination port numbers can happen due to both benign and malicious reasons. A communication
not matching access control list does not automatically mean an attack and requires further checks
that we incorporate in our evidential model.
The decision criteria on whether an access to a service is authorized or not are dependent on the
functionality of the concerned device i that is contextually related to the recorded communication
with the other device. Our access control list at the FIoT needs to set these static and dynamic
rules that determine authorization status for IoT device’s apps/firmware and their corresponding
servers that provide the services. The goal of our FIoT is to design and manage a table that sets
benign access rules of each IoT device i’s app/firmware j both the client-side (source devices) and
server (Destination) side. Next, we discuss how the access control list manages each of the client
and destination sides.

Source IP, Source MAC, and Source Port Number
When an IoT device is first introduced in the network, it has to be registered with the FIoT as an
authenticated device. There are several methods such as two factor authentication [59] biometric [60], and physical layer authentication [61]. This is not our contribution since the client-side
authentication is a standard mechanism, but is important for the completeness of our unified secu-
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rity model.
Our FIoT makes sure that all active data flows at-least do not directly come from outside the
network and are registered IoT devices based on their IP and MAC addresses. Since a device, i,
might offer more than one service, and each such service in an IoT device has a source port no.
This source port no. is ephemeral (not fixed) since the IoT device, in this case, is the client device,
and hence not very critical in terms of security.

Destination Port No., Destination IP, Service ID, Service Type
The key idea of the access control for the server-side of IoT services is maintaining a list of acceptable or expected destination IPs and destination port numbers, which uniquely identifies a server
for the corresponding service. This is possible since for a given service at the application layer, the
destination port no.s and IPs are relatively fixed.
However, maintenance of the destination side of access control is more challenging. Due to the
heterogeneity of devices, applications, and services, that change with time, it is rather difficult to
maintain a scalable static access control policy at the FIoT. Hence, our FIoT uses a very new novel
standard by IETF known as MUD (Manufacturer Usage Description) [4], which can be queried by
the FIoT. which can be queried by the FIoT. The MUD returns a port based access control list that
specifies those ports and use IPs that should be typically accessed by a given service offered by
an IoT device. The MUD uses DNS to resolve the domain name to an IP. Thus, MUD by DNS is
able to point all IP of servers related to the services offered by an IoT device. The MUD urls are
updated by various IoT providers and manufacturers. While not all manufacturer subscribes to the
MUD specification, it is becoming common over time, and thus will become a practical approach
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across communities.
Another alternative is having a static policy enforcement per device since the destination (server)
port numbers are well-known for most service types, there is a direct mapping between destination
port no., destination IP, and the service type. Additionally, the service type is tied to an IoT device
i. For example, a surveillance service offered by a company (say Samsung) is tied to its Samsung
smart cameras (the IoT device). Therefore, while registration, the FIoT can query this information
from the device upfront.

6.1.2

Final ACL Table Specification

The app/firmware is present in the form of IP:port entry. Thus each IoT device has it is a unique list
of authorized IPs (corresponding to servers that provide services related to that IoT device) based
on the apps used by the device to provide services. For example, the services of IoT device i is
provided by using two apps j1 = firmware/os, and j2 = services app, where both j1 and j2 allowed
to have a conversation with only specific devices and servers using IPs of this devices as presented
in Fig 6.1.

Figure 6.1: Smart Home access control policy
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6.2 Factors and Features for Evidence Collection

We identify an appropriate set of factors such that impacts of a variety of different malicious activities can be captured by a small set of our proposed factors. The goal is to find corresponding
mathematical representations of these factors (known as features) that captures the effects of attacks in a numerically quantifiable way, facilitating linearly separable trust scoring models. Thus,
these features form the mathematically tractable evidence that is driven by our proposed set of factors. Such feature based evidence serves as an input to our trust model that produces trust scores,
indicating whether an IoT device is actively or passively part of an attack or not.
We propose to monitor the following characteristics in the FIoT for each device data flows: (1)
Service Access Uncertainty (2) Volume of Uncertain Accesses (3) Service Access Violation (4)
Access Violation Diversity (5) Level of Outgoing Byte Volume. Below we describe each of these
factors.

6.2.1

Service Access Uncertainty

In this section, we introduce the idea of uncertainty in the way we interpret device data flows at the
FIoT. Any packet exchanged between an IoT device and its corresponding server (for any given
service) passes through our FIoT (under our given assumptions). Such packets may or may not
be exchanged between those in the authorized access control list in the FIOT in terms of IPs/port
combination.
Occasionally, packets that do not match the destination IP for a given service in the access
control list, is not necessarily due to an attack and therefore should not be technically treated as a
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violation. This is observed from our observations across various datasets and can be attributed to
the following reasons:
Manufacturer Checks and IoT Vendors: The first reason is that occasionally, packets are sent from
IoT devices to servers that belong to their manufacturer for monitoring purposes (such as estimating the remaining life of a device etc.). This information can be ascertained by the FIoT, by using
a lookup table service such as Info-Sniper [62]. Info-Sniper is a service that provides valuable
information for any IP that includes the following attributes (i) Name of the Owner/Provider (ii)
Geolocation (iii) DNS name (iv) Time Zone. Therefore, packets sent to a given destination IP
can be checked for to ascertain whether the Name of the Owner and other attributes match with
concerned IoT device’s MUD profile (that includes manufacturer/third party vendors of the IoT
service provider).
The Fig. 6.2, Fig. 6.3, Fig. 6.4, are obtained from Info-Sniper using benign and attack IPs
obtain form real network traffic for iHome Plug showing benign IP, uncertain IP, and attack IP
respectively.
As we can see from the Fig. 6.2, the benign IP for cloud service provider matches the IP:port
in the corresponding ACL entry, while Fig. 6.3 the IP is not matching the ACL, but the IP is for
same server provider domain subnet so this is viewed as uncertain in our model.
In Fig. 6.4 the attacking IP is not related to service provider, but it is leaking data to the attacker
server or third party server.
However, the traffic volume in terms of packets/bytes exchanged are low and infrequent due to
the context of the purpose of these manufacturers, while a higher or more frequent traffic volume
could be indicative of an information/privacy leakage from insider attacks. Hence, we treat these
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interactions as uncertain.

Figure 6.2: Info-Sniper: iHome Plug benign IP
IP Forwarding: The second reason for packet exchanges not matching entries in the access control
list, is the use of IP forwarding used mainly to improve the quality of service. The IP forwarding
is a process for handling incoming data traffic at the destination servers (IP: port combination) by
redirecting traffic to a different IP: port. Such IP forwarding is done mostly to guarantee quality of
services (QoS) issues (e.g., too many requests concurrently can be forwarded) or in case of server
maintenance/upgrades/downtimes.
In the IP forwarding, the packets instead of being delivered to the destination IP:port combination in the access control list, are delivered to a different IP:port combination. However, the
frequency of this happening under benign conditions is rather low as evidenced by multiple dataset
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Figure 6.3: Info-Sniper: iHome Plug uncertain IP
studies. Additionally, when port forwarding does happen, it usually goes to a different IP within
the same subnet, but usually the same port. However, since many IoT service providers use cloud
services, this same subnet membership and the same port is often not guaranteed. Therefore, these
occurrences are treated as uncertain interactions in our evidential model for trust, and this also
gives the intuition for our next factor which is the volume of uncertain interactions as shown in
Fig. 6.3.
To conclude, if a packet exchange does not match the access control list, the FIoT checks for
the above-mentioned possibilities (i) a look-up to find whether the concerned destination IP and if
any these are observed then, we label this packet flows as ‘uncertain’. If not, then we would label
this packet exchange as a violation (as elaborated later).
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Figure 6.4: Info-Sniper: iHome Plug attack IP

Mathematically, let us denote an uncertain packet exchange as U (i) (s). Since this happens for
each device across all services we can simply represent this as an event possibility represented as
u, for simplicity of notations.
Number of Uncertain Packets Per Time Window: Therefore, the corresponding feature that we
keep track is the total number of uncertain packet exchanges for a given device i within a time
window T , denoted as

ηu(i) (T ) =

∑

U (i) (s)

(6.1)

T

Our claim that uncertain observations can also be due to attacks is scientifically explained by the
following concrete examples:
Mirai Botnet is a malware DDoS attack that compromises IoT devices to create a botnet that
targets other servers on the same cloud domain as the destination server that provides the service
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for the compromised IoT devices. Such behavior increases the number of uncertain packets when
the adversary uses the compromised IoT device and uses it to perform a DDOS attack on the
servers in the cloud domain of the service provider. The information on cloud services servers is
easy to obtain (i.e., MUD).

6.2.2

Cumulative Volume of Uncertain Accesses

For the case of packet exchanges between IoT devices and its manufacturer/vendor, one can intuitively visualize that up to a certain extent, uncertain exchanges can be allowed a benefit of the
doubt (discounted) while calculating trust scores of a device. However, beyond a certain volume of
uncertain exchanges, this situation should be viewed as suspicious, owing to the infrequent pattern
of this occurrence.
For the case of packets being forwarded to a different IP within the same organizational subnet,
we can see that tracking IPs is not appropriate, but we again find a similar conclusion to the manufacturer IP case, where this pattern of uncertain traffic volume is typically low, and the occurrences
are infrequent.
As such we conclude that evidential modeling should provide some discounting of the effect
of relative uncertainty on trust scores, up to a certain level of uncertain traffic volumes. However,
beyond a certain total uncertain packet volume, the probability of uncertain packets, should not
contribute to the improvement of trust. We will see what this means mathematically in our trust
modeling phase.
Cumulative Sum of Uncertain in a Time frame: At each time window, we keep a cumulative
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sum of uncertain interactions sliding frame of previous F time windows such that

µ(i)
u (T )

=

T
∑

ηu(i) (T )

(6.2)

T −F

6.2.3

Service Access Violation

The second factor for evidence collection for potential malicious activity is the service access
violation. The main idea is that if an interaction from an IoT device does not match the authorized
access control list entries and can neither be classified as uncertain, then this event of access is
(i)

treated as a violation represented as Vj ), i.e., the violation of app j that run inside device i. A
figure illustrating this is shown in Fig. 6.5

Figure 6.5: Service violation workflow
Number of Violation Packets Per Time Window: In fact, for that time window, T the FIoT middleware calculates the total number of access violation of K services by all the appsj1 to jn running
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(i)

on IoT device (Vj ) as shown in Fig 6.5, where

ηv(i) (T ) =

∑

(i)

Vj

(6.3)

T

The services access violation for an IoT device is recorded in terms of the number of sending
and receiving packets with those ‘unauthorized’ (those that cannot be labeled as a match or uncertain) servers. that it is not supposed to communicate with since it’s unrelated to devise functionality
in time interval t. The violation Vji is calculated for IoT device i1 , if it is a firmware or dedicated
app has an unauthorized conversation with another entity i2 . This paragraph explains how FIoT
manages service request violation factor.
Service request violation factor is an indicator that IoT device is affected by certain attacks
that presented with detailed in Chapter three such as DDoS, Fraggle, SNMP, Mirai Botnet, Smurf,
ARP spoofing, TCP SYN flooding, DNS spoofing, redirecting traffic, SSDP. Thus Service request
violation factor is to detect all attacks that targeting security services SSs availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, access control, and Non-repudiation that presented with detailed in
Chapter three.

6.2.4

Access Violation Diversity

The Access Violation Diversity wd is a factor that represents the extent of the cross-section of
services/servers being affected by a given cyber attack. This can be understood in the following
scenario:
Suppose if one device is trying to only access one service 10 times, whereas another device
is trying to access 10 different unauthorized services, within the same time window T . Then the
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threat surface is much wider for the latter case than the former, even when the total number of
violations recorded in a window T is the same. This is because the latter is making 10 services
vulnerable simultaneously, while per service flow is still low.
Access Violation Diversity is an important feature to determine how the attacker trying to grow
its attack impact and compromise more resources. Such behavior is an indicator that IoT device
is affected by certain attacks such as DDoS, ARP spoofing, TCP SYN flooding, Fraggle, DNS
spoofing, SNMP, Mirai Botnet, smurf, redirecting traffic, SSDP.
For example, in the case of SSDP Reflection attack is a malware-based attack that exploits the
vulnerability of the SSDP protocol. The SSDP protocol can be used to discover devices/servers
that offer services in SH without configuration and explicit registration. Thus, SSDP protocol can
be used by an adversary to compromise a registered device, discover other devices and services
of the smart home, and send packets requesting services from multiple other devices within the
smart home and/or to remote servers. The compromised IoT device IP and MAC address are
already registered in FIoT, but the services mapping does not match our access control destination
IP and port no. The FIoT will thus not allow authorized devices from obtaining services that are
deemed unauthorized based on our access control rules. Such SSDP activity can increase violations
but across various devices. The vulnerability of the SSDP allows the attacker to grow its attack
and compromise more resources and affect various servers simultaneously. Hence, this is a more
serious form of violations, and the trust model should be able to incorporate this aspect.
ARP spoofing is possible if the adversary has control of any smart home device (not necessarily IoT device) within the SH network or is directly connected to the fog gateway router. The
fundamental reason is that MAC addresses are used to communicate with devices within the same
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network.
In the case of ARP spoofing, the attacker sniffs the smart home network to obtain the fog gateway router IP. Then by exploiting ARP protocol and it associates its own MAC address informing
that his or her MAC address should be associated with his or her target’s IP address (and viceversa, so his or her target’s MAC is now associated with the attacker’s IP address). Once the fog
gateway receives an ARP message it broadcasts its changes to all other devices on the network, and
all of the target’s traffic to any other device on the network travels through the attacker’s computer,
allowing the attacker to inspect or modify it before forwarding it to its real destination. Apart
from the man-in-the-Middle attacks, the ARP Poisoning can be used to cause a denial-of-service
condition over a LAN by simply intercepting or dropping and not forwarding the target’s packets.
After that the attacker will communicate with all IoT devices in SH telling him I am a router to
grow its attack impact by compromising more IoT resources. In this case, all traffic in SH network
will first go to the compromised node before going to the fog gateway router.
In the registration phase, the FIoT access control associates a static IP with each MAC address.
Thus each IP should match its corresponding MAC address in the access control list. In the ARP
spoofing, the MAC address is the one that is of the compromised IoT device while the IP is of the
fog router. So when a request comes via the compromised IoT to the fog gateway router, IP-MAC
association in the access control.
Thus, FIoT will count each packet from a compromised node (i. e., fake router) as an access
violation, and the communication by the compromised node with other IoT devices will increase
access violation diversity. As we mentioned before the attacker goal is to compromise more resource and collect much traffic, for example, the fake router will communicate with other IoT
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devices and telling them I am the router and the communication should handle by me, as a result,
IoT devices will send him packets instead of the real router and that will increase service diversity
because FIoT will detect this is not the fog real router using IP-MAC association.
Another example is in DDoS attack, the attacker’s goal is denying IoT devices from performing
services and to increase the impact of the attack. The adversary performs attack on as many IoT
devices as possible (in this case most SH services will stop). Also, in the reflection attack such
as SNMP, Botnet, Smurf, SSDP the adversary’s goal is to have resources as much as possible
to increases the impact of the attacking victim server (the attacker may use all SH IoT device to
attack a website server). In order to do that, the adversary has to compromise IoT device and use
it to attack other IoT devices in SH network, that will increase the number of violation diversity
because the compromised IoT will communicate with devices that not supposed to base on FIoT
access control.
We will, therefore, have to embed the effect of how the volume of violations is spread across
various services, into our trust model, and we see how this done in trust scoring model Chapter.
(i)

Number of unique services with violations ηvs (T ): The number of unique services that experienced violations recorded for a given IoT device i in a time window T . Mathematically, it is
represented by the following:

(i)
ηvs
(T )

=

K
∑

I(i, s)

(6.4)

s=1




 1,
where, I(i, s) =



 0,

If i had a violation with a service s
(6.5)
Otherwise
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We will, therefore, have to embed the effect of how the volume of violations is spread across
various services, into our trust model and we see how this done in the trust scoring model Chapter.

6.3 Attack Type and Factor Mapping

The goal of this section is to understand the variety of well-known attacks on the IoT devices and
try to establish the common missing links that cut across various attack types and services and is
independent of the manufacturer by focusing on the network level effects of such attacks rather than
the host-level effects of those same attacks. We classify the attack types into two broad categories
as direct or reflection type attacks. In each category, we describe various cyber-attacks and try to
provide an intuition that builds up to the idea of the unified set of factors described already. This
section justifies why our unified set of factors is successful in getting the required evidence under
cyber attacks.

6.3.1

Direct Attacks

In the direct attack, the attacker flood victim from attacker IP. The most popular availability direct
attack are:
Fraggle (UDP Flooding): it is a network attack, where the attacker broadcast address in the
network by flood router with spoofed UDP traffic [63]. Such attack activities are related to the
number of packets sent each time interval. In UDP flooding, the adversary sends a large number of
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets from a smart home IoT device to a target victims specific
port, to overwhelm the victims ability to offer the service offered over that specific port.
This is because the victim device becomes with responding via an Internet Control Message
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Protocol ICMP (ping) message informing attacker, that the destination is unreachable. Such attack
activities are related to the number of packets sent each time interval. Because the attacker is
targeting a victim that does not match the access control’s IP:Port combination, there will be a
flow recorded in the FIoT whose IP and port will be different from what is already listed as part
of the access control rule. Additionally, this type of attack will also increase the total number of
packets in a given interval.
Ping of Death: Attacker utilizes an Internet Control Message Protocol ICMP (ping) to disrupt
the target machine by sending a larger than allowed packet size (e.g.larger than 65,535 bytes if
IPv4), to freeze, reboot, or crash victim server/IoT device. Because the victim will be unable to
combine packet segments due to a buffer overflow, the target victim will be unable to respond. To
control such an attack, our FIoT puts a limitation on the packet size [63]. Such attack activities are
related to the size of packets per time interval and attack increases the outgoing byte volume.
Ping Flood Attack: attacker utilizes Internet Control Message Protocol ICMP (ping) by continuously sending (flooding) ping requests to disrupt victim server because the victim has to respond to every ICMP echo-request with echo-reply [63]. Such attack activities are related to the
number of packets each time interval and service access violation.
TCP SYN flooding: It is a resource exhaustion attack. The attacker aims to exploit the TCP
handshake process by flooding the victim server with TCP packets, SYN flag and ignore the corresponding SYN-ACK packets. Due to the half-open connection queue, the victim server waits for
the final ACK packet that never arrives, and the attacker keeps sending the SYN packets until it
utilizes all available ports to prevent this victim server from performing any new connections [64].
Thus, this attack is also called the half-open attack, as shown in Fig. 6.6. As one can conclude,

73

such attack behavior is related to the number of packets each time interval, apart from the fact that
it contains SYN packets directed to a variety of ports on the same victim IP, hence the diversity
of port numbers requested is also large. Finally, the IP of the victim may not match with the one
already in the access control. The proposed trust model FIoT, we detect such attack using service
access violation factor, the access violation diversity, and the number of packets per time window.

Figure 6.6: SYN Flooding attack
ARP Spoofing: it is a kind of network attack that targets the LAN protocol, where the attacker
sends a spoofed Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) over the network. Once attacked device (represented as MAC address) obtain valid IP in the smart home network, it will be able to alter,
intercept, or stop data transiting through the smart home network. Thus, APR spoofing targets
an SH local network (targeting all devices connected to the SH router). We would like to make
it clear that ARP spoofing is an outsider attack where the attacker aims to collect the SH private
information without user permission, and it is different from insider attack where device leaking
private data to vendor or third party.
ARP spoofing is possible if the adversary has control of any smart home device (not neces-
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sarily IoT device) within the SH network or is directly connected to the fog gateway router. The
fundamental reason is that MAC addresses are used to communicate with devices within the same
physical network as a known networking principle. There are two scenarios for the ARP spoofing
attack in the SH network.
In the first scenario, the attacker aims to sniff the smart home network to obtain the fog gateway
router IP by exploiting ARP protocol and act as a man-in-the-middle attack to make all the network
traffic transfer using the attacker device to collect SH data. In the ARP spoofing attack, the attacker
is keeping his MAC address and use the fog gateway router IP. Therefore, FIoT will not allow ARP
spoofing attack because, in the registration phase, the FIoT access control associates a static IP with
each MAC address and now the IP-MAC association will not match FIoT access control, so the
attacker device will not allow performing any activities in SH network. We would like to mention
that in our assumption we do not count router as an IoT device.
In the second scenario, the only way for the ARP spoofing attack to bypass FIoT access control
is to obtain a valid IP for a smart home IoT device and compromise it. In this case, the attacker
will be able to bypass access control list policy because the compromised IoT device IP and MAC
address are for an IoT device that already registered in FIoT and IP-MAC association match access
control. Clearly, this scenario is not the classical ARP spoofing attack, because, in the classical
ARP spoof, the attacker aims to get valid IP and keep using his own MAC address (not compromised device MAC address) to perform as a man-in-the-middle attack. However, that does not
happen in this scenario.
An example of such a scenario is an ARP type spoof that is used to the compromised IoT
device to perform Botnet attack, or for packet dropping (not considered in this work) attacks. Our
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method cannot detect this type of attack is a limitation, since these attacks do not increase packets,
or violate any established control policies.

6.3.2

Reflection Attacks

In the reflection attack, the attacker can use an IoT entity to perform an attack on other devices/
services using the internet without requiring hijack an IoT device. The attacker only needs to
sending a spoofed query message to an IoT device from a fake IP address, so the device responds
to the victim [53]. Thus, the difference between direct attack and reflection amplification attack is
in the attacker attacking victim using his machine IP while in the reflection amplification attack, the
attacker attacking victim using spoofed IP (i.e., fake IP). Both reflection and amplification attack
use spoofing IPs, but in the amplification attack, the request is less than a reply. Reflection attack
activities are related to a number of packets, size of packets, and number of IPs:port (conversation)
with other devices in the time interval. In the proposed trust model FIoT, we detect such attacks
using service access violations, service access diversity, and outgoing transmission factors. An
example of a reflection attack is listed below:
Custom Malwares: it is a software design to disrupt IoT device operations and move to other
devices laterally, usually to create a Distributed Denial of Service attack. The common types of
malware are Mirai, spyware, Hide and Seek, viruses, worms, Trojan Horses, rootkits, ransomware,
Hajime, Muhstik, Hakai, and Torri (most advanced malware) [63]. Such attack activities are related
to the size of packets, time, a number of the packets in an interval, and destination IP:port in the
time interval.
The proposed trust model FIoT detect such an attack using one or more factors by extracting
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features from traffic such as access violation diversity, services access violation, service access
uncertainty, the volume of uncertain access and outgoing transmission volume. Because the victim
server will not match access control IP:port combination. If the attacker tries to attach another IoT
device in SH that will increase access violation diversity and service access violations.
SMURF: it is a network attack where the attacker flood router with spoofed ICMP traffic via
sending a request to devices with spoofed IP of victim server/IoT. Thus, the devices will respond
to the targeted victim, and that will disturb the victim server/IoT device operations. Such attack
behavior is related to the number of packets each time interval.
In the proposed trust model FIoT detects such attacks using service access violations, and
access violation diversity factors because the victim server will not match access control IP: port
combination. If the attacker tries to attack another IoT device within SH, that will increase access
violation diversity.
Botnet Driven Attacks: it is a kind of malware based DDoS attack that compromises multiple
IoT devices to turn them into a ‘bot’, i.e., create a distracted network of IoT devices from one or
more SH to using them, as a source of volumetric traffic attack to bringing down websites, servers
or possibly other IoT devices that offer actuation services (e.g., turning off an SH light in the night)
For example, IoT device compromised with Miria Botnet malware will scan IPs in SH network
looking for responses to ping requests from the victim in order to log into the victim (IoT device)
using a default credential security vulnerability [52]. If the SH owner changed the default credential of IoT devices, the Miria Botnet (bot) would try to compromise another device. Because of any
request packets from compromised IoT devices targets a victim IP: port that does not match the
way the access control entries are set up, certain violations of service access will be recorded. If
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the attacker tries to compromise more IoT resources (if the SH owner changed default credential),
in SH, any communication not matching the access control mapping will count as a violation and
increase the access violation diversity.
Another scenario of Miria Botnet is using the compromised devices to attack several other
IPs or ports within the subnet of the service provider’s domain. This will increase service access
uncertainty, the volume of uncertain access.
SNMP Reflection: like other reflection attacks, involves eliciting a flood of responses to a
single spoofed IP address. During an SNMP reflection attack, the perpetrator sends out a large
number of SNMP queries with a forged IP address (the victims) to numerous connected devices
that, in turn, reply to that forged address. The attack volume grows as more and more devices
continue to reply until brought down the target network under the collective volume of these SNMP
responses. Such attack behavior is related to the number of packets each time interval and service
access violation because the victim IP:port combination will not match access control and that will
increase the number of violation packets.
SSDP Reflection: it is a malware app run on SHowner device use standard Simple Service
Discovery Protocol (SSDP) to discover IoT devices in SH [65]. It also uses Universal Plug-n-Play
(UPnP) port forwarding to allow direct attack IoT devices by an external attacker. Mainly, that
SSDP and UPnP port forwarding is conventional in SH network because many P2P applications
are using it. Such attack behavior is related to the number of packets each time interval. In the
proposed trust model FIoT we detect such attacks using service access violation and service request
diversity factors.
For example, in the case of the SSDP Reflection attack, the adversary uses the SSDP protocol
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to discover the devices and services in SH. SSDP protocol is used to discover services and devices
in SH without explicit configuration. Thus, the SSDP Reflection attack will increase the access
violation diversity because the adversary uses the compromised IoT device to discover SH services
and devices using the SSDP protocol from these devices that it should not use.
Additionally, the SSDP attack allows the attacker to grow its attack and compromise more IoT
devices and target more servers. The compromised IoT device IP and MAC address are registered
with the FIoT access control list, but the services mapping (as proposed in our ACL policy) requested is not matching access control which is understood by a port number mismatch. In such a
case, the number of violations with unique servers will be recorded.
UDP-based Distributed Reflective Denial of Service (DRDoS): is a DDoS attack, where the
adversary spoofs an IP that belongs to a target server on the internet and uses the SH IoT devices,
to send a huge volume of false requests to a to overwhelm a target server on the internet, to makes
services offered by server unusable. Individually, the adversaries send packets to the weaponized
victim IoT devices, containing the source IP address of the concerned targets IP. The victim IoT
device erroneously thinks that it is obliged a response to this source IP, albeit a tremendous response. This action, when simultaneously repeated from several IoT devices, can effectively block
the target from offering its services. While reflection attacks, themselves are nothing new, the
sheer scale of IoT devices compared to legacy IT infrastructure and the lack of on-device security
and IoT security standards, make the threat of reflection in the IoT era manifold several orders of
magnitude. Such attack behavior is related to the number of packets, number of IP:port in a time
interval. In the proposed trust model FIoT we detect such attacks using service access violation
and service access diversity, and outgoing transmission factors.
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Figure 6.7: A summary of some IoT attacks and how they relate to our factors

A summary of some attack types detected by FIoT presented in Fig 6.7 show factors and features that related to each attack, also the figure shows the attack impact on security services.
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CHAPTER 7
TRUST MODEL FOR SMART HOMES

7.1 Preliminaries

7.1.1

Modeling Evidence as Dirichlet Distributions

IoT device trust scoring model is designed for device-specific input data. Such input data will
act as a body of evidence for each device that is translated into a trust score via the trust scoring
model explained in the subsequent chapter. If the scoring model is accurate, the trust scores of
attacked devices will be lesser than the non-attack IoT devices. Therefore, it is natural that the
body of evidence of each device should ideally point towards degrees of positive, negative, possibly
suspicious interactions between the IoT device and the rest of the internet.
We know that our evidence state space from each IoT device includes matching interactions,
violation interactions, and uncertain interactions. Each interaction is at the level of number of
packets. Hence, one can visualize the evidence state space as a multinomial distribution. Based on
the current evidence and the past evidence (if available), one can find the posterior belief that an
IoT device i, is going to provide a matching, violation, or an uncertain interaction in future. Such
posterior beliefs are calculated using Bayesian inference.
Bayesian Inference dictates that the posterior belief is equal to the product of the likelihood of
the observed data (in this case evidence) given the underlying model parameters, multiplied by the
prior of the model parameters, normalized by the marginal likelihood of the data.
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Mathematically, let the observations (data) in each evidence category be represented by D =
{ηm , ηv , ηu } for a given device i. Similarly, let θ = {θ1 , θ2 , θ3 } be the unknown probability vector
of the required posterior beliefs for matching, violation, and uncertain interaction.
Here the θ is the unknown probability parameter (also known as model/hypothesis), and the
D is the concentration hyperparameter (also known as data/observation). The goal of Bayesian
Inference is to estimate the θ based on observational evidential data denoted D.
Formally, the statement of Bayesian Inference is the following:

P (θ|D) =

P (D|θ).P (θ)
P (D)

(7.1)

where P (θ|D) is the posterior belief probability parameter vector, P (D|θ)is the likelihood of
the model, P (θ) is the prior probability of the model, and the P (D) is the marginal probability.
In many books the likelihood is rewritten as

P (D|θ) = L(P (θ|D)

The above re-representation is often helpful because it brings home the intuition on the conditioning over the observed data. For convenient calculation of the posterior, the posterior and the
prior needs to be in the same family of probability distribution for the solution to be mathematically
tractable. For example, if the posterior is multinomial like in our case, the Dirichlet distribution as
prior is in the same family, and this prior is called a conjugate prior for the concerned likelihood
function.
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In this case, the likelihood function is multinomial categorical distribution, and it’s well-known
conjugate prior is the Dirichlet distribution. Essentially means that choosing a Dirichlet prior over
the mean will ensure that the posterior is also Dirichlet.
Therefore, the posterior probability can be modeled by the Dirichlet distribution, which is
represented as follows:

1 ∏ Di−1
θ
B(α) i=1 i

(7.2)

α = (α1 , . . . , αK )

(7.3)

K

f (θ1 , . . . , θK ; D1 , . . . , DK ) =

∏K
i=1 Γ(αi ))
,
B(α) = (∑
K
D
Γ
i
i=1

Solving the posterior with the help of a multinomial likelihood and a Dirichlet prior is shown in
Bhattacharjee et.al [66], which showed that the posterior is equal to the mean vector of the Dirichlet
distribution if the prior is assumed to be a non-informative prior. Mathematically, a posterior belief
of any category θi is represented as

Di + 1
f (θi |Di ) = ∑K
i=1 Di + K

(7.4)

In our model K = 3, and {θ1 , θ2 , θ3 } is b, d, u and the {D1 , D2 , D3 } is {N − (ηv + ηu ), ηv , ηu }.

7.1.2

Josang’s Belief (JB) Model

Josang’s Belief Model [67, 68], is one of state of the art methods for quantifying trust of any entity
given the posterior degrees of belief (positive interactions), disbelief (negative interactions) and
uncertainty (uncertain interactions) are known. Any evidence state space if already not ternary
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can be mapped into this ternary state space. For example, in a 5-star restaurant rating system, the
evidence state space may be mapped as 1,2 contribute to disbelief, 3 contributes to uncertainty and
4,5 belief. Once this is done, the expected belief (trustworthiness) E(ω) is given by:

E(ω) = b + a.u

(7.5)

where a is a parameter that is known as relative atomicity, which controls the extent to which uncertainty should contribute to total trustworthiness E(ω). In other words, relative atomicity controls
how much benefit of the doubt is given to the uncertain portion of the evidential data while assessing the trustworthiness of the entity that produced the evidence ω = b, d, u. However, Josang’s
Belief Model does not specify how to calculate a and suggests that it depends on contextual factors. In the absence of any other information, it is suggested that a is the inverse of the cardinality
of the state space of the output classifier. For example, if the output is a binary of trust or not to
trust, and no other information is present, a = 0.5

7.1.3

Dempster Shafer’s Belief (DS)

The Dempster Shafer (DS) theory from 1976, has seen a lot of modifications, but in simple terms,
it looks into the difference between the degrees of total belief and total disbelief.

dm(ω) = b − d

(7.6)

The difference between josang’s and DS model is that DS model’s basic definition allows for
multiple source fusion of beliefs and disbeliefs.
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7.2 Our Expected Belief Definition

Unlike Josang’s Belief Model, we propose expected truthfulness as a complement of the weighted
disbelief and weighted uncertainty that likely should not be accounted for towards trustworthiness.
Mathematically, we visualize this expected disbelief which is

E(ω ′ ) = wd .d + wu .u

(7.7)

such that 0 < wd < 1, 0 < wu < 1. The deviation from the Josang’s Belief and Dempster
Shafer structurally is that both d and u are given weights. The reasoning of the presence of dual
weights and how they are designed is explained later.
However, at a high level, we define the expected truthfulness of an IoT device by

T R(i) = 1 − wd .d − wu .u

(7.8)

7.3 Disbelief Probability Mass (d)

A Bayesian inference [49] gives the posterior probability belief of the access violation. We apply
the known derivation provided in [68], and find the following
If there is no prior information, the posterior disbelief mass is given by the following:

(i)

(i)

d

nv + 1
= (i)
,
N +3

(7.9)

However, if prior information of the access violation exists, then the posterior belief mass is
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modified by the following equation [69]:

(i)

d(i) =

C
nv + br
,
N (i) + 3

(7.10)

Where C = constant and br is a base rate prior probability of observing a violation from an IoT
device. Usually, the base rate is low, but if the observed violations, then the base rate is updated
and becomes higher than usual.
However, Eqn. 7.9 and 7.10 can both serve as the disbelief mass based on the nature of available network data. In either case, d(i) provides an indication of the proportion of violations to the
total number of accesses.

7.4 Designing Weighing Function of Disbelief Probability Mass (wd )
While the disbelief mass indicates, the relative proportion of violation, it does not provide any idea
on the attack scale or surface over which this proportion of violation was recorded. If the same
proportion of violation is recorded from more unique number of devices as part of the violations,
then it is more serious attack than the same proportion of violation targeting only one device in a
given time window. Therefore, we need to add weight to the d(i) , which embeds the importance of
how many unique devices were involved in the observed proportion of violations.

( (i) )
τv(i) = 1 + a.log eηvs

τv (i) ≥ 1

(7.11)

(i)

Where a > 0 is a scalar factor, and ηvs is the number of unique outgoing IPs with which
violations have been recorded for each an IoT device i in the current time window T . Intuitively,
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Figure 7.1: Illustration of τv
(i)

the higher the ηvs , the more prominent the indication that the attack via this IoT device, is used to
connect to a larger number of devices. This is an indication of a more serious attack, than another
attack with the same proportion of violations in a given time period, but that proportion is spread
over a lower number of outgoing IP devices. Hence, it would make sense to have a monotonically
increasing non-linear weighing function. Eqn. 7.11 provides this embedding in the model, and the
curvature of the non-linear increase of τv is controlled by the value of a. Fig 7.1 showing how liner
function Eqn. 7.11 looks like.
Finally, we scale this to an interval between 0 and 1, giving the final equation of for the weight
of the violation mass, Fig 7.2 sowing how wd (τv ) non leaner function looks like.

wd (τv ) = 1 − a.e−|τv |

(7.12)
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Figure 7.2: Illustration of wd
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7.5 Uncertainty Probability Mass

The uncertain mass for suspicious communication of larger volumes with servers which cannot
be excluded from the authorized access control list is a critical part for internal attacks. Here, we
already stated that the number of uncertain requests are a deviation from the expected number of
requests.

(i)

u(i) =

nu + 1
,
N (i) + 3

(7.13)

7.6 Weighing Function Design for Uncertainty Probability Mass

The intuition behind the design of the weighing function of the uncertain probability mass is that
the suspicion increases as more number of uncertain interactions emerge
Stationary phase

1

wu
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0.6
Exponential phase
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Cumulative Uncertain Volume

Figure 7.3: Illustration of uncertainty weight

wu (.) =

1
(1 + Ab .e−Bb µu )1/ν

(7.14)

where Ab > 0 is the initial asymptote, 0 < Bb < 1 is the growth rate parameter, 0 < ν < 1 is
the displacement parameter. Fig. 7.3 shows the relationship of wu with the total uncertain packet
volume.
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Role of Initial Asymptote: The initial asymptote Ab controls the y-intercept of the wu when the
µu = 0 and depends on the risk attitude of the owner. The physical meaning is that the extent of
benefit of doubt you will provide even no uncertainty was recorded. The higher the value of A, the
smaller than starting initial value of wu function, and thus regardless of the other parameters, the
wu will attain a slower growth with increasing ηu .
Role of Displacement Parameter ν: The displacement parameter controls the value of x-axis at
which the wu function starts to enter the exponential growth phase. The smaller the value of ν, the
larger is the value at x-axis for which the wu starts to enter the exponential growth phase. In other
words, it decides the length of the lag phase in terms of the independent parameter.
Role of Growth Parameter The growth parameter controls the value of the x-axis at which the
wu attains its maximum value 1. The higher the value of Bb , the lesser is the value of x-axis at
which wu ∼ 1. In short, this parameter determines that once the exponential phase starts, what
will be the length of the exponential phase in terms of the independent parameter before it attains
its maximum value of 1.

7.7 Linearly Separable Trust Scoring
Plugging in wd , d, wu , u into Eqn. 7.8, we get T Ri = 1 − wd .d − wu .u.
Now we know that in logistic regression the response variable is linked to the independent variable via a non-gaussian distribution and therefore needs a link function. The typical link function
for a binary response variable (trusted or not trusted). Typically, when the response is a binary, the
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logit link function is an appropriate link function that is given by:
(

E (i)

T R(i)
= log
1 − T R(i)

)
(7.15)

The Eqn. 7.15, facilitates trust scores that are linearly separable by a threshold that helps in
classification between trusted or non-trusted devices.
To follow convention of trust metrics that are typically represented as a bounded value such as
[−1, +1] or [0, 1], we choose the convention of representing the final trust score as a value between
-1 and +1. Therefore, we scale the E (i) by the following:

F R(i)

)
 (

(i)


+ 1 − e−|E | ,












)

 (
(i)
=
− 1 − e−|E | ,
















 0,

if E (i) > 0

if E (i) < 0

(7.16)

if E (i) = 0

such that F Ri ∈ [−1, +1] is the final trust value of device i.

7.8 Trust Evolution and Maintenance over time

In order to update trust scores in On-Off attacks, we should take into account both the behavior
of nodes during the current time slot and the historical behavior of nodes during previous time
slots. In this regard, we propose Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) scheme using
weighted trust scores obtained from Equation 7.16. This scheme uses both the weighted trust score
during the current time slot (F R(i) (T )) and the cumulative moving average of trust scores before
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(i)

(i)

that time slot (F Rmavg (T − 1)) to update the current cumulative moving average (F Rmavg (T )).
(i)

F Rmavg (T ) indicates the data integrity of IoT network at time T . However, AWMA does not use
a traditional cumulative moving average. AWMA is based on the socially inspired concept that
bad actions are far more remembered than good actions. This fact establishes the basis of AWMA
scheme where current weighted trust score and cumulative moving average trust score are given
different weights under different scenarios with respect to a threshold, denoted by Γon−of f .
The value of Γon−of f is dictated by the system specific risk attitude or the which defines what
can be considered as sufficiently good behavior. Different scenarios are differentiated by defining
four weighting factors χa , χbmax , χcmin and χd such that 0 < χa < 1, 0 << χbmax < 1, 0 <
χcmin << 1, and 0 < χd < 1. It should be noticed that since χcmin is significantly smaller than
χbmax , it causes an asymmetry. Now, there are four possible scenarios at time t with regard to the
threshold:
(i)

Scenario (I): F Rmavg (T − 1) > Γon−of f ,
(i)

Scenario (II): F Rmavg (T − 1) > Γon−of f ,

and
and

F R(i) (t) > Γon−of f ;
F R(i) (T ) ≤ Γon−of f ;

(i)

and

F R(i) (t) > Γon−of f ;

(i)

and

F R(i) (T ) ≤ Γon−of f .

Scenario (III): F Rmavg (T − 1) ≤ Γon−of f ,
Scenario (IV): F Rmavg (T − 1) ≤ Γon−of f ,

In Case (a), a cumulative moving average higher than Γon−of f suggests that the system is
maintaining sufficiently good behavior. If the current weighted trust score is also higher than
Γon−of f , it suggests continuity of good behavior. Hence, continuing good behavior is rewarded
mavg
with a high weighting factor (χa ) to wdi (t) and a low weighting factor (1 − χa ) to wdi
(t − 1).

We name χa as the rewarding factor such that 1 > χa > 0. It helps a historically reliable system
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to improve, or at least maintain its reputation if it also behaves in a cooperative manner in time slot
t. Thus, for Case (a), the cumulative moving average is updated as:

(i)
(i)
F Rmavg
(T ) = (1 − χa ) × F Rmavg
(T − 1) + χa × F R(i) (T ).

(7.17)

In Case (b), a cumulative moving average higher than Γon−of f and a current weighted trust
score less than Γon−of f suggests that the system is maintaining a sufficiently good behavior up to
time t − 1 and then initiated some anomalous behavior. Hence, all the good behaviors until now
need to be forgotten and a very high weight be given to the current slot’s anomalous behavior.
This will force the system’s cumulative moving average to quickly decrease. Once this happens,
Case (c) would ensure that the cumulative moving average is not able to redeem itself quickly.
mavg(t−1)

Therefore, wdi (t) is assigned a large weight (χbmax ) such that 1 > χbmax >> 0 and wdi

is weighted with 1 − χbmax . We name χbmax as the punishment factor. The larger the value of
punishment factor, the quicker the drop of the trust score. Hence, the system’s reaction to new
evidence of malicious behavior will be more severe. In such cases, the cumulative moving average
is updated as:

(i)
(i)
(T − 1) + χbmax × F R(i) (T ).
F Rmavg
(T ) = (1 − χbmax ) × F Rmavg

(7.18)

In Case (c), a cumulative moving average lower than Γon−of f but a current weighted trust score
higher than Γon−of f signifies a system where current inputs are cooperative but has a history of
anomalous behavior which may be as recent as t − 1. Therefore, we assign wdi (t) a very small
weight χcmin such that 0 < χcmin << 1 to cancel out its large value. In addition, we assign a large
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i
weight 1 − χcmin to emphasize F Rmavg(T
−1) . We name χcmin as the redemption factor that controls

how fast or slow a system with malicious history can redeem its trustworthiness if it shows good
behavior for a sufficiently long time. Redemption factor also makes it possible for systems in noisy
environments to redeem their trust scores. A low redemption factor ensures that the trust score is
not increased quickly even though a system starts to behave honestly after a period of malicious
behavior. In this case, cumulative moving average is updated as:

(i)
(i)
F Rmavg
(T ) = (1 − χcmin ) × F Rmavg
(T − 1) + χcmin × F R(i) (T ).

(7.19)

In Case (d), both cumulative moving average and current weighted trust score are below
Γon−of f . It indicates anomalous behavior in both the current time slot and previous time slots.
In such a case, we define χd as the retrogression factor which is assigned as the weight to the
current weighted trust score. Also, 1 − χd is assigned to the cumulative moving average. So, the
cumulative moving average is updated as:

(i)
F R(i)mavg (T ) = (1 − χd ) × F Rmavg
(T − 1) + χd × F R(i) (T ).

(7.20)

Unlike cumulative and exponential weighted moving averages, our proposed asymmetric weighted
moving average (AWMA) scheme is effective for trust management during On-Off attacks. In Section ??, we illustrate how AWMA scheme works by comparing it with CWMA and EWMA. Also,
we discuss that AWMA is effective in distinguishing malicious IoT data inputs for networks experiencing intermittent noise.
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7.9 Parameter Optimization and Threshold Selection

As we know, the classification of IoT devices based on trust scores as well as optimizing parameters
of a learning model can be done by either taking a supervised or unsupervised approach. Below
we show how our proposed trust model can be implemented in both supervised and unsupervised
mode.

7.9.1

Supervised Approach

The supervised approach is feasible if there is the availability of labelled datasets of attacks and
no attacks. In such cases, the training set and cross-validation sets can be used to observe the
difference in trust scores of the two classes.
Parameter Selection: For optimal parameter selection of the trust model to be generic, one
needs to decide on an appropriate loss function. In this case, our loss function is the square difference of the sum of compromised devices trust scores and the sum honest devices trust scores. The
goal is to maximize this difference, that will improve the accuracy of classification.
( ∑ F R(i) ∑ F R(i) )2
H
e=
− M
H
M
s.t.

Ab > 0;

0 < Bb < 1;

0 < ν < 1;

(7.21)

a>0

where H and M are numbers of devices used in the cross validation process from the benign
and attack sets. In our cases, H and M are equal since we have for each device an instance of the
benign in the training and instance of the attack in the cross validation set. Specifically, we used
two devices H = M = 2 for cross validation. The solution of Eqn. 7.21, can be done through
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two alternatives: (a) Grid Search Approach (b) A Gradient Descent based Approach. A gradient
descent approach is a more computationally efficient, for finding the optimal parameters, when the
number of parameters are large and the search space in each parameter is huge.
However, for gradient descent approach to be applicable, the error or loss function needs to be
a convex function, which is hard to guarantee. On the other hand, in our problem, the number of
parameters are less (i.e. 4) and the search space is also limited for two of those parameters. Hence,
for simplicity, we use a brute force grid search method to find the parameter values that maximize
the error function.
Our definition can be easily extended to an approximate convex function by taking a negative
logarithm of the above error function, which is concave. However, the resulting approximate
convex function may need further processing to ensure differentiability and existence of global
minima. For this work, we have ignored the gradient descent based approach, because the scale of
our problem is much smaller than the traditional ML techniques which have a large parameter set.
After the optimal parameters have been identified, we find map the trust scores for a device
for the benign and a small portion of the attacked dataset. We then use an support vector machine
(SVM) to find the optimal separation between these labels of trust scores for all devices belonging
to the UNSW dataset. The learnt threshold serves as Γon−of f .

7.9.2

Semi-Supervised Approach to Classification

In semi-supervised approaches, only benign data is known. In such cases, the idea is to find the
boundary regions of final trust scores on the trust plane axis for only not attacked data.
The efficacy of the semi-supervised approach can be understood by the fact that attacked de-
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vices should produce trust scores which are outside the identified boundary region of trust scores
during the training phase. Here the optimal parameter selection is wholly based on the observations during the training set. However, in this approach there is a concern over the generality of
the approach across different datasets. We have tried to introduce simulated attacks to show how
this boundary changes with attacks of various strengths. We did not investigate this part, because
whether low packet volume simulated attacks have the same affect as the cyber attacks collected
from real datasets is not known. Our evaluation is done based on a supervised approach.
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CHAPTER 8
EXPERIMENTAL AND RESULTS

This chapter presents the experimental design, results and performance evaluation of the proposed
trust scoring model middleware FIoT in terms of detection of malicious behavior of smart home
(SH) IoT devices and its reflection on the evolution of trust scores. We first discuss the experimental design whereby we explain how we use the real datasets of attacks and benign network traffic
for experimental set up. Then we present section wise, our results from the UNSW IoT dataset,
CTU IoT-23 dataset, a simulated dataset with arbitrary attack strengths. In each of these sections,
we have subsections that present results on different types of devices selected from these datasets.

8.1 Experimental Design

The flow of the experimental set up used for the evaluation of middleware FIoT with the trust
model is done using seven steps divided into four stages, as presented in Fig 8.1. The explanation
of steps in each stage are:
1. Data Collection (Stage 1): This is the first stage, where we collect benign and attacked datasets.
These datasets are in the form of network traffic flows from IoT and non-IoT devices captured at the edge or fog gateway. In this work, we use data set for ten days of benign network
traffic and five days of attacked network traffic obtained from UNSW Sydney university [4],
the CTU dataset, Prague for 3 days of benign and about 4 days of training, and simulated
attack variations of varying time lines for further assessing sensitivity of detection.
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Figure 8.1: FIoT process steps and stages
Step (1) SH Network: This step is like a map of IoT and non-IoT devices in SH. The
map presenting the number and the type of all registered IoT and non-IoT devices that communicate using SH WiFi network. In this step, we define the fog node router gateway, MAC
address, IP for all SH devices and set the access control list of fog getaway. This step is
like the index of SH that we use to know the traffic for an IP is related to which device. (in
this research we consider only IoT devices and filter out the non-IoT devices). This step is
to ensure that all SH devices are working and connected to fog node getaway using WiFi
network. In this research we did not implement real SH network but we used raw dataset
collected from real SH network.

Step (2) .PCAP Files: after setup SH network and all SH devices working in the network.
The traffic generated by the SH devices needs to collect, and this step is responsible of
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collecting IoT and non IoT devices traffic flow data. In order to collect SH data, we have
to capture SH fog gateway network traffic in a PCAP format (raw data). The collected data
could be benign or attacked from both IoT and non-IoT devices.
In this work, we use data set for ten days of benign network traffic and five days of attacked
network traffic obtained from UNSW Sydney university [4]. All network traffic datasets are
available in the form of daily network traffic flows using application programming interface
(API) that saved as packet capture format (.PCAP). The PCAP file contains all network
activity in a coarse-grained (device-level) fashion and fine-grain (flow-level) fashion that
programmed in the router using Software Define Network (SDN). In this research, we did
not implement real SH network to collect PCAP files. We used real SH network traffic for
both IoT and non IoT devices from label data set obtained from UNSW Sydney university.
2. Preprocessing (Stage 2): After collecting data we needs to get a benefit from dataset by analyzing it, but that required preprocessing collected data to make it useful for analyzing and
usable to FIoT. Reading PCAP file can do in many ways such as using Wireshark software,
or Joy tool from Cisco to filter the conversation for each IoT device and save the filtered
traffic as Excel format.
Step (3) Data Parsing: The collected PCAP files from Stage1 is read using software such
as Wireshark, Cisco Joy, that helps it to convert to PCAP and then into JSON files, or CSV
format that is readable and parsable by scripting languages such as Python and MATLAB.
In this work, we use Wireshark to read the PCAP file format for analyzing and understanding network traffic. The Wireshark is a free and powerful network traffic monitoring and
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analyzing software [70]. In this step, Wireshark is used to monitor network activity in a
coarse-grained (device-level) fashion by filtering the conversation for each IoT device only,
and exclude non-IoT devices. Based on the conversation of each IoT device, we can recognize all other MAC address, IPs and ports that have a conversation with IoT device. Based
on the IP address, we detect all other SH IoT, non-IoT devices, and all servers that have a
conversation with the IoT devices.
Step (4) Filtering: The CSV files contain the device traffic flows that is now usable for
detecting malicious activities through alpha numeric data. The CSV file includes timestamps
in per second, number of packets per second, packets size in bytes per second for each IoT
device. In a real deployment on the middleware, however, CSV files are bulky and slow, and
thus one would need to convert the .PCAP into JSON files that are lightweight, and can be
stored and read easily by our trust model running as a part of the deployed FIoT middleware.
3. Stage 3 Data Analysis: In this stage, we use filtered and preprocessed data to extract the
features that applicable to FIoT detection factors that we proposed. I will explain the features
and factors in a different section. We then calculate the trust scores for the labeled honest
dataset.
Step (5) Apply Factors and Extract Features: In this step, we extract features from CSV
files by analyzing the behaviour of each IoT device app/firmware that presented as IPs:ports
to extract essential features. The major features are recorded per hour (the time window
granularity): (i) number of IPs:port violated, (ii) number of packets exchanged, (iii) number
of unauthorized, and uncertain packets hour, and (vi) Number of Unique IPs in violation for
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a given time window, by comparing it with MUD flows, Info-Sniper look up and the ACL
tables.
Step (6) Training and Cross Validation: In general trust model step is based on device
behavior and applying learning and cross validation on the output of step 5.
The input of this step is the output of the previous step. In this research, for example for the
UNSW, we used ten days of benign network traffic and five days of attacked network traffic.
A set of 10 days (230 hours to be exact) of benign dataset used for learning, a set of 2 days
(46 hours to be exact) of attack dataset used for cross-validation. In this step we calculate the
hourly number of benign packets exchange, hourly number of uncertain packets exchange,
and the hourly number of attacked packets exchange for each single IoT device. To prove
the generality of our trust model, we plan to apply it with differently labelled data set and
simulate our volumetric attack scenarios. The cross validation set contains both benign and
attack periods, hence it helps to find examples of both honest and malicious behaviors and
sets.
4. Stage 4 Testing Set and Classification: this is the final stage that responsible of calculating
and update trust v alue for each IoT device using FIoT trust model middleware.
Step (7) Apply Trust Model FIoT: this is the final step that provides us with trust value by
using Excel file as an input for FIoT model code. The test set containing attacks is appended
to the training set to give a continuous notion of time, and then we plot the trust scores with
the trust management schemes to show the evolution of trust during the test set containing
attacks. For customer usability sake, we provide the following simple representation for the
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smart home owner to interpret the security status of their devices: Given the range of trust
scores that can be between -1 to 1 there are four trust classes: (i) trust value between 1 to
0.51 represent high trusted with high confidence. (ii) trust value between 0.5 to 0 represent
the device is trusted with low confidence. (iii) trust value between -0.51 to 0, represent the
device is not trusted with the lower confidence (iv) trust value between -0.5 to -1 represents
the device is not trusted with high confidence to do not trust the device.
Note that this is different from the scientific view where the threshold Γon−of f = 0.02, but it
makes sense since it is almost the mid point between the range trust values. The trust value
is a dynamic value that updates hourly. The trust value is easy to understand and clear to
any level knowledge level SH user to recognize any IoT devices that performing suspicious
behavior in SH. It also changes due to the fact that attacks may not happen every hour and
also attack strengths may marginally increase over time. Hence, the same device can have
different trust values based on what stage of attack progression, we are looking at. Thus, this
division of the trust space is done for a qualitative indication of the contextual response of
the end user/application observing these trust values.

8.2 Dataset Description

8.2.1

UNSW Dataset

The data used for validation is a real network traffic flow for a total of 28 IoT and non-IoT devices,
we select four IoT devices, the selection is based on the attacked devices that mentioned on [4]. The
data set used in the validation is benign and attack data. The only information we have about the
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row data is data have two types of volumetric attack, direct attack and reflection attack. The direct
attacks include ARP spoofing, TCP SYN flooding, Fraggle, and Ping of Death. The reflective
attacks include SNMP, SSDP, TCP SYN, and Smurf [4]. We compare our result with the results
from literature in terms of detection speed and attack detection generality, where FIoT detect node
misbehavior that may due to attack immediately while other detection tools detect the attacks after
days or months.
FIoT detects node misbehavior using raw data (pcap file) without focusing on the attack name
or attack features, and this is the significant contribution of this work. FIoT uses features based
on proposed set of unified factors that are general, simple, and available in any network traffic and
not dependent on attack or device specifics. The features are matching, violation, and uncertain
represented as (ηm , ηv , ηu ) respectively, as well as access violation diversity and total uncertain
packet volume. This property gives FIoT the simplicity and applicability with any IoT network
traffic data set. In this thesis, FIoT calculates TV hourly using a total number of packets per
second for the chosen IoT devices. Therefore, the trust value calculates and update in an hourly
basis.

8.2.2

Aposemat IoT-23 CTU dataset

The Aposemat IoT-23 dataset, is a labeled IoT network traffic dataset of real IoT devices containing
benign and attack traffic samples collected from a Philips HUE smart LED lamp, an Amazon Echo
home intelligent personal assistant, and a Somfy Smart Door Lock and available from [5]. The
Aposemat IoT-23 dataset was collected as a part of the Avast-AIC laboratory funded project during
2018 and 2019 at the Stratosphere Laboratory in the Czech Technical University in Prague.
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In the Aposemat IoT-23 dataset, captured three benign and 20 attacked .pcap files for Mirai,
Torii, Hide and Seek, Hajime malwares executed of different IoT devices. The pcap file contains
more than 500 hours of traffic that include more than 760 million packets and 325 million labeled
flows. Some pcap file is for hours because the traffic grew so fast and capture stopped before 24
hours, while other pcap file have a day of captured traffic. In this research we did not used all the
dataset, but used three benign days and one attack day for each IoT device, totally 242 hours is
used for model validation.

8.2.3

Simulated Dataset

We take the benign samples from the Aposemat CTU dataset, and then add attacks but with lower
packet volumes and customizing attack effects on different factors of our model, to test how the
proposed method’s sensitivity is effected. Specifically, this contains results where the attack volumes are lower than the benign packet volume, and we try to analyze the effectiveness of our
approach in those cases, the recommended changes that might be required to customize our approach to such attacks.

8.3 UNSW Dataset Experimental Results

In this section, for each IoT device, we first show a plot of attack and benign packet profile from
the attack dataset with the ground truth idea of the attack. In this figures, the y-axis is for a number
of packets per hour and the x-axis is for a number of hours used int the testing. Note that
Next, we show four figures showing the results of our framework in terms of (i) (FR) the raw
trust score per time window without any moving average update (shown by the solid dark yellow
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line), (ii) Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) (shown by the red dashed line), and
(iii) Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by the double-dash blue line), and the
(iv) combine all the three figures into single figure. In each of these figures, the y-axis represents
the trust value, and x-axis represents time per hour.

8.3.1

IoT Device Amazon Echo

The Fig. 8.2 is plot Amazon Echo traffic profile for benign packets per hour (shown by the solid
blue line) verse attacks packets per hour (shown by the red dashed line) to present Amazon Echo
hourly behaviour. In the figure, the y-axis is for a number of packets per hour and the x-axis is for
a number of hours used int the testing. As we can see from the traffic profile the attacker stating
the attack and slightly increasing it and keep attacking in the same level until reach a point that
raises the number of attack packets for one hour and reduce attack and almost stop it.
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Figure 8.2: Amazon Echo traffic profile
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The Fig. 8.3(a) shows the raw trust values (FR) value for Amazon Echo is high for the first
ten days (first 230 hours) because the data is benign and there is little reduction in trust values for
the first ten days due to the low volumes uncertainty (ηu ). This prove the sensitivities of FR trust
scheme to detect uncertain interactions packets.
In the attack days after the first hour of attack occurred FIoT detect Amazon Echo misbehavior
and reflect that as FR trust scheme value. Clearly, the FR reduced to the negative that means
the device is not trusted after the attack occurs and that prove FR value is able to reflects attack
behaviour. In summary, the FR trust scheme reduced when the attack occurs, and reduce sharply
when the attack increases sharply.
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Figure 8.3: Amazon Echo: (a) FR (b) AWMA

In the Fig. 8.3(b) the AWMA value is below the FR, and when FR increase because the device
is not performing malicious behaviour, the AWMA is growing slowly because the punishment of
misbehavior is much more than the reward and that because this is one of the significant properties
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of reputation in trust system. In summary, the AWMA trust scheme reduced when the attack
occurs, and reduce sharply when the attack increases sharply while increase slowly when the attack
stops.
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Figure 8.4: Amazon Echo: (a) CWMA (b) comparing trust management schemes

The Fig. 8.4(a) is a plot CWMA value that increased slower than AWMA because it is a kind of
long term memory that used to keep track for previous behavior of attacker. The Fig. 8.4(b) combines the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values (FR) (shown by the solid
dark yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) (shown by the red dashed
line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by the double-dash blue line)
for IoT device Amazon Echo.
Precisely, FIoT detects malicious activities of Amazon echo based on behavior not based on
specific attack. Also, when Amazon Echo reduce or stop misbehaving the trust value did not
enhance sharply, but it enhanced slowly to maintain the probability of trust that when losing the
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trust, you need to work loyally for a long time to gain it again, and mostly it will not reach the
same level had before losing the trust. Form the figures we observe that FIoT successfully detect
Amazon Echo misbehaving immediately, and reflect that to TV score. Any node has scored below
than zero should be no longer on services until farther investigation from smart home (SH) owner
or specialist. In this way, FIoT supports the security and the privacy of SH without adding security
overhead to fit the limitation of IoT devices. Additionally, FIoT successfully reflect IoT device
behavior and make it visible to SH user to review the behavior in multi trust management scheme.
Unsurprisingly FIoT showing a great job in detecting malicious behavior when the attack packets
are little above or close to the number of benign packets. As we can see from the figures that FIoT
can detect any kind of malicious misbehavior

8.3.2

IoT Device Philips Hue Bulb

The Fig 8.5 is a plot of Philips Hue Bulb traffic profile for benign packets per hour (shown by the
solid blue line) verse attacks packets per hour (shown by the red dashed line) to present Philips
Hue Bulb hourly behaviour. In the figure, the y-axis is for a number of packets per hour and the
x-axis is for a number of hours used in the testing.
As we can see from the traffic profile the attacker stating the attack for three hours and stop it
for 12 hours, after that the attacker sharply increases the attacked packets for one hour and stop it,
the attack data behaved as an ON-OFF attack, after that start slight attacked packets. In this next
part, we will show how FIoT can reflect attack behaviour and converted it to trust value (TV) multi
trust management format FR, AWMA, and CWMA.
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Figure 8.5: Philips Hue traffic profile

1

1
0.8

Attack Begin

0

Attack Begin
Attacked Days

0.4
0.2
0

No Attacked Days

-0.5

Philps Hue AWMA

0.6

Attacked Days

0.5

Ttust Value

Ttust Value

Philps Hue FR

0

50

100

150

No Attacked Days

-0.2

200

250

300

Time Interval (Hour)

-0.4

0

50

100

150

200

Time Interval (Hour)

(a)

(b)

Figure 8.6: Philips Hue Bulb: (a) FR (b) AWMA
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In the attack days after the first hour of attack occurred FIoT detect this misbehavior and reflect
that on the TV. As we can notice from the Fig. 8.6(a) after Philips Hue performing a malicious
activity, the raw trust value FR reduced to the negative that means the device is not trusted. Also,
it is clear from the figure that the FR value reflects malicious behavior. As we can see the FR value
reduced sharply from 0.997 to -0.1887 after the device performed malicious activities for the first
hour and FR value keep reduced for the next hour because the device keeps performing malicious
activities. As we can see, the FR keep slightly increased not sharply increased when the Philips
Hue stop performing malicious activities. That to maintain trust properties of the trust losing fast
but earning slowly and FIoT present that in a number format. While FR reduced sharply after IoT
device starts performing malicious activities for two hours. Thus, FIoT can detect Philips Hue
malicious behavior and ON-OFF attack.
In the Fig. 8.6(b) AWMA values decrease sharply when the IoT device smart bulb Philips Hue
perform start performing malicious activities. Also, the plot showing that AWMA is increasing and
decrease smother and less than raw trust value FR. That because the reward of benign behavior is
less than the punishment of malicious behavior and that maintain the property of trust.
The Fig. 8.7(a) is a plot CWMA values that decrease sharply when the IoT device smart bulb
Philips Hue perform start performing malicious activities. As we can see CWMA is less sensitive
when the device reduces attack value because it is a kind of long-term memory of device malicious
behavior that gives fewer rewards and that visible in and that clearly visible in the Fig. 8.7(b) is a
plot showing raw trust value (FR) (by the solid dark yellow line), Asymmetric Weighted Moving
Average (AWMA) (by the red dashed line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA)
(by the double-dash blue line) for IoT device Amazon Echo. In the figures, y-axis represented
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Figure 8.7: Philip Hue Bulb: (a) CWMA (b) all trust management schemes

trust value, and x-axis represents time per hour. In summery FIoT successfully detect Philips Hue
malicious activities including ON-OFF attack in multi trust management scheme and provide TV
that is able to understand and recognize to SH user about device security statues based on device
behavior

8.3.3

IoT Device iHome Plug

Fig. 8.8 the number of attacked packets some time is less than the number of benign packets
and mostly above it. When the misbehavior starts, FIoT reduces TV to below zero, and the devices
become not trusted. Unsurprisingly, we prove, (i) FIoT successful in detecting node misbehavior in
case of benign packets is much more than attack packets. (ii) FIoT successfully showing the effect
of uncertainty in calculating FR, AWMA, and CWMA by given low TV to malicious activity with
less uncertainly (most are attacked packets).
Fig. 8.8 is a plot benign and attack devices behavior, from plot we can recognize that number
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of attacked packets some time is much less than the number of benign packets but mostly number
of attacked packets is above the number of benign packets. Clearly from figure the device increase
its benign activities when it was under attack, such behavior gives us indication that the device is
compromised and in the same time performing services as expected. Such behavior should make
detection misbehavior almost impossible by SH user without FIoT. While using the proposed trust
scoring middleware is able to detect such malicious activities .
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Figure 8.8: iHome Plug traffic profile
Fig. 8.9(a) is a plot the raw trust value FR reflect attack behavior as trust value, when the
misbehavior start the FR value is below zero that mean the FIoT detecting the malicious activities
of iHome Plug.
As we can see, the trust value is keep reduced slightly because the iHome device keeps performing malicious activities, despite some time the number of benign packets is much larger than
the number of attacked packets. That prove FIoT detect malicious activities in case of benign
traffic larger than attack traffic. Fig. 8.9(b) is a plot AWMA that become below zero when the
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devices perform malicious activities and we can see that AWMA is below FR value to maintain the
properties of trust losing fast and earning slow.
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Figure 8.9: iHome Plug: (a) FR (b) AWMA

Fig. 8.10(a) is a plot CWMA value that decreased sharp when iHome Plug performed malicious activities. CWMA value is keeping reduced gradually because the iHome Plug device keeps
performing malicious activities, despite some time the number of benign packets is much larger
than the number of attacked packets. That prove how FIoT sensitive in detecting any malicious
activities in all traffic condition such as case of benign traffic larger than attack traffic.
Fig. 8.10(b) is a plot all trust management scheme used in this research, raw trust value (FR) (by
the solid dark yellow line), Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) (by the red dashed
line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (by the double-dash blue line) for IoT
device iHome Plug. In the figures, y-axis represented trust value, and x-axis represents time per
hour. In summery FIoT successfully detect iHome Plug malicious activities including in multi trust
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management scheme and provide TV that is able to understand and recognize to SH user about
device security statues based on device behavior. Unsurprisingly, we prove, (i) FIoT successful in
detecting node misbehavior in case of benign packets is much more than attack packets.
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Figure 8.10: iHome: (a) CWMA (b) all trust management schemes

8.3.4

IoT Device Samsung Camera

Fig. 8.11 is a plot of Samsung Smart Camera traffic profile for benign packets per hour (shown by
the solid blue line) verse attacks packets per hour (shown by the red dashed line) to present Philips
Hue Bulb hourly behaviour. In the figure, the y-axis is for a number of packets per hour and the
x-axis is for a number of hours used int the testing. Clearly that the attacked number of packets is
close to the number of benign packets most the time locks like mirror data to different destination
server (third party server), also some time the attack increase sharply and other time attacker stop
performing attach (ON-OFF attack).
The figures below showing FIoT middleware is able to reflect attack behavior and converted it
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Figure 8.11: Samsung Camera traffic profile
to visible trust value that able to understand by any knowledge level SH user. In the subfigures, yaxis represented trust value in trust scheme, and x-axis represents time per hour. FIoT successfully
detect malicious activities by Samsung Camera and device become entrusted after the first hour of
performing malicious activities. The TV rein all forms RF, AWMA, and CWMA, is dropped when
the device starts performing malicious activities.
Fig. 8.12(a) is a plot raw trust value FR that keeps reducing slightly when the device continues
performing malicious packets at the same level and sharply when the device increases the malicious
activities. The level of sharp reduce in FR value is based on the sharp increase in the malicious
packets as we can see the FR increase each hour slightly when the device stops performing an
attack. The raw trust values (FR) value is high for the first ten days (first 230 hours) because the
data is benign and there is little reduction in trust values for the first ten days due to the low volumes
uncertainty (ηu ). This prove the sensitivities of FR trust scheme to detect uncertain interactions
packets.
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Fig. 8.12(b) AWMA value is less sensitive and below the value of FR, and when FR increase,
when the device stop performing malicious behaviour, the AWMA is growing slowly because
the punishment of misbehavior is much more than the reward and that because this is one of the
significant properties of reputation in trust system. In summary, the AWMA trust scheme reduced
when the attack occurs, and reduce sharply when the attack increases sharply while increase slowly
when the attack stops.
FIoT middleware is able to reflect attack behaviour and converted it to visible trust value that
able to understand by any knowledge level SH user. In the subfigures, y-axis represented trust value
in trust scheme, and x-axis represents time per hour. FIoT successfully detect malicious activities
by Samsung Camera and device become entrusted after the first hour of performing malicious
activities. The TV rein all forms RF, AWMA, and CWMA, is dropped when the device starts
performing malicious activities.
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Figure 8.12: Samsung Camera: (a) FR (b) AWMA
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Fig. 8.13(a) is a plot CWMA value that keeps reducing slightly because the device performing malicious activities (packets) and stop and return performing malicious activities. In order to
increase CWMA value the device should stop performing malicious activities for a long time because the reputation of the device is low and it needs a long time of honest behavior to change it.
Clearly, FIoT not only successfully able to detect malicious activities of Samsung Camera but also
it successfully maintains trust and reputation properties.
The Fig. 8.13(b) combines the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values
(FR) (shown by the solid dark yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA)
(shown by the red dashed line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by
the double-dash blue line) for IoT device Amazon Echo. It is clearly that CWMA keep decreasing
slightly while FR and AWMA value are increase and decrease based Samsung Camera behavior
because CWMA less sensitive to good behaviour and gives more weight punishing to malicious
behavior.
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Figure 8.13: Samsung Camera: (a) CWMA (b) all trust management schemes
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8.4 Apostemat Avast IoT 23 Dataset

In this section, we will try to detect the misbehavior of the IoT devices Somfy Smart Door Lock,
Amazon Echo, and Philips Hue Bulb using labeled dataset obtained from Czech Technical University (CTU), Prague, Czech Republic, where attacks were applied on the devices via custom
malware. The purpose of this section, is to show that our model performs seamlessly for a different dataset collected by a different research group.
For each IoT device, we plan the following common outline for representing the results:
The first figure is a plot of attack and benign packet profiles from the attacked dataset, where yaxis is for a number of packets per hour and the x-axis is the time index. We show this plot as a
ground truth of packet dynamics of the underlying attack such that the trust value dynamics can be
analyzed against this.
The second and third figures each contain two sub-figures, making a total of four figures that
show our trust value dynamics across both parts of benign and attacked set. These four figures show
how FIoT detects the malicious behavior of IoT devises app/firmware by plotting the time series of
trust values in four ways: (i) FR (shown by the solid dark yellow line), (ii) Asymmetric Weighted
Moving Average (AWMA) (shown by the red dashed line), and (ii) Cumulative weighted moving
average (CWMA) (shown by the double-dash blue line) (iv) a comparison of all trust management
schemes that use FR trust as their core input. In all them, the y-axis represented trust value, and
x-axis represents time per hour.
In this data set we use a three benign days, and each IoT device has attacked hours different
from the other. The total number of hours used for FIoT detection validation are 242 hours. The
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first three days (69 hours to be exact) is benign, followed by periods of attacks as launched in the
dataset.

8.4.1

Somfy Smart Door Lock-CTU

The Fig. 8.14 shows a plot of the Somfy Smart Door Lock device’s traffic profile for benign packets
(shown by the solid blue line) versus the attacks in packets (shown by the red dashed line) to present
Somfy’s behavior over time during the test (attacked) set to show the ground truth of the profiles.
As we can observe from the traffic profile, in the first hour the number of benign packets is
higher than the number of attacked packets. Also, from the first hour, the attacker starts the attack
hourly slightly increasing or decreases in the same attack volume level without sharply increasing
or decreasing to maintain a stealth level.
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Figure 8.14: Somfy Smart Door Lock Traffic Profile Attack

The Fig. 8.15(a) shows the raw trust values (FR) calculated by our trust model without any
trust management scheme over the whole benign and attacked set. We can observe that the Somfy
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device’s base trust score (FR) is high for the 70 hours, out of which 69 hours are benign. After
the 70th hour of the dataset (after an hour of attacks), there is a progressive degradation of the
trust score (FR), eventually going below 0 into the negative domain of trust scores. This reflects
that despite that the number of benign packets per hour is much higher than the number of attack
packets, this does not prevent our framework to detect attacks.
The trust value reduces to 0.245 and keeps reducing it until it becomes negative in the third
hour. Hence, our FIoT trust middleware could recognize Somfy misbehavior in the first hour,
becomes classified as not trusted in the third hour. Also, the FR value keeps reducing hourly since
the attacker continues to perform the attack. After the second hour, the attack is larger than benign,
hence the trust value degradation is quicker than the previous hours of the attack (69-71 hours).
Clearly this figure proves that FR value is able to reflect the behavior of relative attack strength
changes.
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Figure 8.15: Somfy Smart Door Lock: (a) FR (b) AWMA
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In the Fig. 8.15(b) the AWMA value is below the FR, and using AWMA FIoT is able to detect
Somfy misbehavior and recognize it as a not trusted service from the first hour of the attack, unlike
FR that detect it in the third hour of the attack. AWMA reduces quicker because the attacker
continues performing attack and the punishment of misbehavior is much more than the reward.
This is one of the significant properties of trust management in the trust system. Clearly the
AWMA trust scheme reduced when the attack occurs.
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Figure 8.16: Somfy Smart Door Lock: (a) CWMA (b) all trust management schemes

Fig. 8.16(a) is a plot of the CWMA value that reduces sharply in the first hour of attack;
however, does not trusted degrade below zero until the third hour of attacks, unlike AWMA. The
CWMA decreases slower than AWMA because Somfy keeps performing malicious activities, and
it is a kind of long term memory that is used to keep track of previous behavior of the attacker.
The Fig. 8.16(b) combines the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values
(FR) (shown by the solid dark yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA)
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(shown by the red dashed line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by
the double-dash blue line) for IoT device Amazon Echo.
Precisely, FIoT detects malicious activities of Somfy Smart Door Lock based on behavior not
based on specific attack. The Somfy Door Lock had an Torri Malware attack, that was not part of
the previous dataset. From the above figures, we observe that FIoT successfully detect attacks, by
reflecting that through our proposed trust scoring framework.
Any node has scored below than zero should be no longer on services until further investigation
from smart home (SH) owner or specialist. Any device has trust score below 0.5 that mean it has
low level of trust with low confident and that also, required further investigation. Clearly, FIoT
supports the security and the privacy of SH without adding security overhead on device, to fit the
limitation of IoT devices. Additionally, FIoT successfully reflect IoT device behavior and make it
visible to SH user to review the behavior in multi trust management scheme. Unsurprisingly, the
FIoT shows a great job in detecting malicious behavior when the attack packets are little above or
close to the number of benign packets. As we can see from the figures that FIoT can detect any
kind of malicious misbehavior.

8.4.2

Amazon Echo-CTU

The network traffic used in this device is a 69 hours from benign dataset and four hours from
attacked dataset. The Amazon Echo device used in this section is from the CTU dataset that we
used to prove system generality.
The Fig. 8.17 shows for the Amazon Echo device’s traffic profile during the attack dataset. The
benign packets (shown by the solid blue line) and attack packets (shown by the red dashed line) to

122

present Amazon Echo’s ground truth behaviour during the attack dataset. In this figure, the y-axis
is for a number of packets per hour (of the order of 105 and the x-axis is for a number of hours in
the test set. We can see from the traffic profile that in the first two hours, the number of packets
belonging to attack activity is much higher than the number of packets corresponding to the benign
activity. Thereafter, the attack packets reduces sharply after the second hour, to a just a little above
benign packets. Also, the attacked packets reduce slightly each hour, and tries to align itself with
the benign behavior. Next, we shall see how our framework responds to such an attack evolution.
The specific malware involved in the attack dataset, is the Hide and Seek.
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Figure 8.17: Amazon Echo-CTU traffic profile

Fig. 8.18(a) shows the raw trust values (FR) value for Amazon Echo is high for the first three
days (first 69 hours) because the data is benign. In the last four hours corresponding to the attack
dataset, we observe a decrease of the trust value, which indicates detection of the misbehavior due
to the malware.
Specifically, in the first hour of attack, the trust value for FR scheme sharply reduces to −0.855
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since the number of attack packets are very high, as well as the access violation diversity was very
high, due to the nature of the malware that increased the weight of disbelief.
From the second hour on wards, the reduction of FR is slow each hour because the attacker
is trying to reduce the volume of attack packets and trying to enhance FR value. However, due
to our effective trust management scheme at the FIoT, successfully maintaining trust properties of
earning trust is hard and required time we see that the barely enhancement in FR value is only
0.0550 after four hours of reducing the attack.
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Figure 8.18: Amazon Echo-CTU: (a) FR (b) AWMA

In the Fig. 8.18(b), the AWMA value is slightly below the FR. The AWMA value however does
not increase/recover at the same rate when the number of attacked packets reduced each hour unlike
FR value. The enhancement in AWMA value after four hour of reducing the attack value is 0.0163
and this value is barely visible. that showing how FIoT is capable to maintain trust properties
and provide accurate trust value that reflect device behavior. Clearly AWMA trust scheme reduces
when the attack occurs and recognizes the Amazon Echo as a highly not trusted device.
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Figure 8.19: Amazon Echo-CTU: (a) CWMA (b) all trust management schemes
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Figure 8.20: Magnified comparison between trust management schemes
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Fig. 8.19(a) plots the trust value using a CWMA trust management scheme. The CWMA
increases a little faster than AWMA and slower than FR when the Amazon Echo devices keep
performing malicious activities and AWMA is a kind of long term memory for average IoT device
behavior that used to keep track for previous IoT device behavior. The Fig. 8.19(b) combines
the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values (FR) (shown by the solid dark
yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) (shown by the red dashed line),
and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by the double-dash blue line) for IoT
device Amazon Echo. As we can see from the figure all trust scheme are able to capture device
misbehavior especially AWMA.
In short, the FIoT detects malicious activities of Amazon Echo based on behavior, not based on
specific attacks. Also, when the Amazon Echo’s attack volume decreases, the trust values does not
enhance sharply. From the figures, we observe that FIoT successfully detect Amazon Echo misbehaving immediately, and reflect that to trust score. Any node has scored below than zero should be
no longer on services until farther investigation from smart home (SH) owner or specialist. Any
device has trust score below 0.5 that mean it has low level of trust with low confident and that also,
requires further investigation, and any trust value below -0.5 is highly not trusted.
Clearly, FIoT supports the security and the privacy of SH without adding any security and
privacy overhead to fit the limitation of IoT devices. Additionally, FIoT successfully reflect IoT
device behavior and make it visible to SH user to review the behavior in multi trust management
scheme. As we can see from all above FIoT can detect any kind of malicious misbehavior.
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8.4.3

Philips Hue Bulb-CTU

The network traffic used for the Phillip Hue Bulb device contains 69 hours from benign dataset
and 7 hours of attacked dataset. The Philips Hue used in this section is from CTU dataset, that we
use to prove system generality.
Fig. 8.21 plots the Philips Hue device’s traffic profile throughout the attacked dataset, in terms
of the benign flows (shown by the solid blue line) versus the attack flows (shown by the red dashed
line) in terms of packets per hour. As we can see from the traffic profile, in the first 3 hours the
number of attacked packets is higher than the number of benign packets, and then their difference
reduces sharply to zero in the third to the fifth hour. In the sixth hour, the attacks restart keeping
a similar volume as the benign flows and stops at the attack at the last hour. This attack profile
is a classic example of the ON-OFF attack strategy discussed in the threat model chapter. The
concerned malware which produced this attack is Muhstik.
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Figure 8.21: Philips Hue-CTU profile attack
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Fig. 8.22(a) shows the raw trust values (FR) for Philips Hue is high for the first three days (first
69 hours) because the data is benign.
In the first hour of attack, the FIoT successfully detects the Philips Hue attack and reflects
that through the FR trust value that decreases sharply. The FIoT reduces the trust value of the
Phillips Hue to FR scheme sharply that because the number of attack packets are high in the first
hour coupled by high access violation diversity that increase the weight of disbelief. The FR value
from the second hour increases slightly due to slightly due to the reduction in the volume of attack
packets.
The FR value starts to recover showing some increase in the third, fourth, and fifth hour because
the attacker stop performing the attack (OFF period). The FR value again reduces slightly in the
sixth hour because the majority of the attacked packets show leakage within the same domain of
the services.
However, one point is clear from the behavior of the FR values’ increase. It underscores the
need for AWMA or trust management scheme that could prevent this observed increase in the trust
values, if attacks evolve over time and changes from violations to uncertain by changing its target
servers.
In the Fig. 8.22(b), the corresponding AWMA value is below the FR and is more interesting in
terms of how the AWMA is key to handling attacks with On-Off strategies and evolving temporal
behaviors. Using the AWMA trust update scheme, the FIoT is able to prevent the trust value from
increasing during the off periods, unlike the FR. Specifically, the AWMA almost has the same
value when the number of attacked packets reduced and stopped for three continuous hours unlike
the FR and the CWMA values. There is no trust value increase in the AWMA value after the fourth
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Figure 8.22: Philips Hue-CTU: (a) FR (b) AWMA

hour of reducing the attack volume is barely visible. This shows that our FIoT that implements
AWMA is capable of maintaining the trust properties and provide robust trust evolution compared
to CWMA.
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Figure 8.23: Philips Hue-CTU: (a) CWMA (b) all trust management schemes
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The Fig. 8.23(a) is a plot CWMA value that reduce sharply in the first hour of attack and
recognize Amazon Echo as not trusted device. The CWMA trust value increases (recovers) faster
than the AWMA although it is slower than the FR, because Philips Hue keep performing malicious
activities in the second hour with comparatively lesser volume than first hour of attack. However,
the CWMA increases in its average trust value unlike AWMA, due to the attack stoppage and then
change from violation to uncertain interactions.
The Fig. 8.23(b) combines the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values
(FR) (shown by the solid dark yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA)
(shown by the red dashed line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by
the double-dash blue line) for IoT device Philips Hue. As we can see from the figure all trust
scheme are able to capture device misbehavior especially AWMA that giving more robust results
in terms of evolving attack behavors affecting trust properties.
In Summary, the FIoT detects malicious activities of Philips Hue based on behavior not based
on specific attack type. Also, when Philips Hue alternates its attacks between ON and OFF periods,
and evolves from attacking targets from outside the service domain (violation) to within the service
domain (uncertain), the our overall framework is still successful in keeping the trust value sharply
different from benign dataset. Furthermore, our framework more importantly prevents recovery in
the trust values but not allowing quick increase in the trust values as the attacks evolve and change
its behavior.
Clearly, FIoT supports the security and the privacy of SH without adding any security and
privacy overhead to fit the limitation of IoT devices. Additionally, FIoT successfully reflect IoT
device behavior and make it visible to SH user to review the behavior in multi trust management
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scheme.

8.5 Simulated Attack Dataset with Varying Attack Strengths

8.5.1

Scenario One

In this section we simulate attack scenarios not captured in the real datasets, to verify the FIoT
trust middleware’s response. Fig 8.24(a) is plot showing simulation of IoT device traffic profile
for benign packets per hour (shown by the solid blue line) verse attacks packets per hour (shown
by the red dashed line) to show devise hourly behaviour. As we can see from the traffic profile
shows the number of attacked packets is less than the number of benign packets. The attack
volume remains fairly constant, without sharp changes in attacking behavior. In this scenario, we
implement an attack strategy such that the volume of violation packets is lower than the uncertain
packets volume for 23 hours, but only one server is targeted.
Fig. 8.24(b) combines the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values (FR)
(shown by the solid dark yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) (shown
by the red dashed line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by the doubledash blue line) for IoT device Philips Hue for the scenario 1. We can see from the figure, all trust
schemes have a higher than usual trust values compared to the real attacked dataset. Although, the
trust values are lower compared to the benign dataset, they do not drop below zero.
This indicates that one has to retrain thresholds as a function of these trust values in a supervised
manner, if one has to classify it as an not trusted device. However, from the perspective of drop in
trust value, a time series based detection where the parameter is the trust value itself should suffice.
In summary, the FIoT is unable to classify device as not trusted if we just use the real datasets
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to train a threshold in a supervised manner for the purpose of classification.
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Figure 8.24: Limitation Scenario: (a) traffic profile (b) all trust management schemes

8.5.2

Scenario Two

In this section, we simulate attack scenario, that also includes the effect of the violation access
diversity. Specifically, we simulated an attack like scenario one with the exception that more
than one servers were targeted (containing violations) the benign and the attack packet volumes
are comparable. The Fig 8.25(a) is plot showing a simulation of Philips Hue IoT device’s traffic
profile for benign packets per hour (shown by the solid blue line) verse attacks packets per hour
(shown by the red dashed line) to show device’s hourly behaviour. In the figure, the y-axis is for
a number of packets per hour and the x-axis is for a number of hours used in the simulation test
setting. As we can see from the traffic profile shows the number of attacked packets (violation +
uncertain) is just less than the number of benign packets and the attack keeps the attack strength at
a constant level without sharp changes in its attack strength.
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Unlike scenario one, the difference in this scenario that we increase the violation IP to three IPs
instead on one, and that a slight increase in the number of violation packets volume. However, it is
still less than the number of uncertain packets, and the summation of both violation and uncertain
packets (that were actually caused by attacks) are less than the number of benign packets for 46
hours.
8.25(b) combines the dynamics of all trust management variations: raw trust values (FR)
(shown by the solid dark yellow line); Asymmetric Weighted Moving Average (AWMA) (shown
by the red dashed line), and Cumulative weighted moving average (CWMA) (shown by the doubledash blue line) for IoT device Philips Hue. As we can see from the figure, all trust scheme are able
to capture device misbehavior especially AWMA that giving more interesting result in term of
trust properties. As we can see from the figure, our FIoT trust middleware is able to recognise IoT
device as not trusted device, but the time to detection is much larger than usual with the threshold
trained over the real datasets.
Specifically, it takes about 22 hours to detect the attack using AWMA and FR.Another interesting observation is that existing CWMA shows a higher score than the AWMA for most of the
simulation time line, proving AWMA’s advantage.
In retrospect, from this simulation we get an intuition that a k-nearest neighbor clustering based
approach towards classification for declaring security status, is probably more appropriate than a
linearly separable threshold based approach. However, such an approach cannot be integrated with
the trust management scheme, which needs a threshold trust score per time window, around which
the weighted updates of the device trust depend on. Hence, the best way to improve sensitivity of
detection is to use simulated attacks with low attack volumes, and then re-train the Support victor
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machine (SVM), that will give a higher threshold than what was returned when trained over real
datasets. A higher threshold would mean that all these values which are at the borderline now, will
be successfully inferred as malicious and the trust management values will also work by using a
higher Γon−of f .
In summary, the FIoT is able to recognize device as not trusted if there is access violation
diversity and the volume of violation is lower than the uncertainly and both are lower than the
volume of benign packets using AWMA trust scheme from first hour and FR trust scheme after 22
hours while CWMA failed to recognize devise as not trusted . Nevertheless, CWMA successfully
able to reflect device misbehavior as trust score and recognize it as trusted with low confidence
because CWMA values are close to zero and that represent device is not confidence.
In conclusion, the two scenario are used to first to show the generality of FIoT, second to show
the limitation of FIoT middleware and, third to show the effect of access violation diversity in term
of detection.
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8.6 Comparison with other works

In this research, we detect threats using real devices labelled data for network traffic .pcap files for
ten benign days and five attacked days. We use the one data set for ten benign days for learning,
and two attacked days for cross-validation and three attacked days for testing, the total hours for
each device are around 350 hours obtained from [4].
The existing methods presented by [68, 4] is about evaluated the traffic of attacked IoT devise for the detect attack later by applying Markov Chain F-score (nearest neighbored) and, True
Positive rate (TPR), False Positive rate (FPR) to compare the detection with different windows
size, without proposing a scoring model for detection. Also, other behavioral detection methods
required to deal on coarse-grained device-level activity, and with fine-grained flow-level activity
for accurate detection while our framework, works only on coarse-grained device-level activity.
Also, our FIoT based trust middleware framework is not only able to statically detect malicious
IoT devices but also it also able to maintain dynamic reputation and trust-building properties that
clearly indicates a time line of the attack behavior, when it starts, and how they evolve through
the representation of various trust management schemes. In particular, the AWMA is significant
in terms of final trust values since it is robust to trust improvement, while FR and CWMA point
to time instances of attacks only. For the same datasets, other works in [68, 4] have shown more
missed detection and false alarms compared to us, for the same devices. Finally, we went beyond
existing datasets, by reducing the attack volume to show how the proposed framework responds
as a function of lowered attack volume. We do not know whether such low volumes help the adversary, achieve the goal or not, but it provides an unbiased evaluation of the sensitivity of our
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framework.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUDING AND FUTURE WORK

9.1 Concluding Remarks

Vulnerable IoT devices increase the risk of attacks on smart homes and cause not only sensitive
information, but also operational malfunctions in smart home operations. Additionally, the sheer
scale of vulnerability in various IoT devices can be used as a weapon to launch DDoS attacks on
target servers over the internet in a more effective manner as compared to traditional cyber device
attacks.
We believe that security and privacy services in IoT systems can be optimized by using a
decentralized fog deployed trust scoring model middleware that can quickly detect IoT devices,
whose apps are directly or indirectly involved in such attacks.
This should improve the performance and efficiency of security and privacy services by providing a trust score for each IoT device based on service behavior. We propose a FIoT that calculates
the trust scoring model based on evidence collection thus fusing an application-based design access control list to a provide trust score for each IoT device based on app/firmware behavior and to
maintain trust building and reputation characteristics.
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9.2 Summarizing Contributions of this Work

In this section, we outline the key aspects of this dissertation. First, we provide a broad outline of
our contribution that gives an overarching sketch of the proposed solution. Then, we delineate the
salient parts of the contribution and discuss specific details separately.

9.2.1

Broad Outline of the Contribution:

In this dissertation, we propose a trust scoring model that can be deployed as a part of a fog domain
middleware, that assigns each IoT device a trust score based on observed data network layer data
flows without deep packet inspection. The trust scoring model is designed in such a way that IoT
devices which are actually attacked by an adversary or used indirectly for launching cyber-attacks
get a much lower trust score.
The proposed dissertation can be viewed as a series of sequential modules. There are three
main phases: evidence collection, a trust scoring model, and classification to find the compromised
devices or ascertaining the incidence of attacks. For evidence collection we offer a pre-processing
step, which is the design of a service level access control list that takes a service-level view rather
than a device-level view of establishing baseline rules for allowed communication flows. Then the
evidence collection proposes a unified set of factors that uses artificial reasoning to set features
that are significantly impacted if a device is under attack. Such evidence in terms of the features,
serve as inputs to a trust scoring model that maps such device-specific evidence (observations) into
a trust score, such that it can produce low trust scores when devices are under attack. Finally,
the scores are supplied to a classifier that can ascertain whether the devices are trusted or not.
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We prove this by showing that on an attacked dataset the same trust model for the same device
produces significantly lower scores as compared to a non-attacked dataset.

9.2.2

Service Level Access Control at FIoT

The novelty of the access control list is that instead of taking a device-level view, it takes a service
level view of the client (IoT) side as well as the server-side (IoT service providers). Specifically,
the behavior of the apps that run on each IoT device and how they request services are taken
into account. We propose the use of either manufacturer usage description URLs (if available),
or automatic self-learning of the baseline access rules by the fog domain trust middleware from
known benign datasets verified by InfoSnip lookup. This is done by using a dynamic access control scheme that is formed by configuring a mapping between apps that run on IoT devices and
corresponding services.

9.2.3

Device Specific Evidence Collection

We propose a small set of common factors and corresponding features that are affected by a wide
range of attack types and are independent of the device manufacturer or provider, making our
method a unified approach compared to other approaches that need separate learning or accommodations for each attack or device type. The proposed factors include service access uncertainty, the
volume of uncertain accesses, service access violation, service violation diversity, and outgoing
transmission volume. We provide justification on why these factors are affected by a wide range of
attack types based on artificial reasoning and rule making that is inspired by artificial intelligence.
These set of common factors and features are subjected to all outgoing and incoming flows to and
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from IoT devices in a smart home to generate a piece of device-specific evidence over discrete
time intervals known as windows. Each window contains a set of numeric values corresponding to
each feature. This serves as input to the trust scoring model which produces a raw trust value FR
per time window. In our implementation, the time window had a granularity of 1 hour. Hence, the
features were calculated on a per hour basis based on the datasets, which had a time slot granularity
of 1 second.

9.2.4

Trust Scoring Model

The trust scoring module maps the time sequence of evidence into a time sequence of trust score
values. The trust scoring module is another critical part of this module which proposed the use of a
Bayesian Belief based Model augmented with novel non-linear weighing and activation functions,
(forming an explainable neural network architecture) designed specifically for our problem. The
weighing functions are designed such that probabilistic discounting of parts of the evidence caused
by benign changes are appropriately embedded in the scoring module that explain the success under
attacks. The unique part is the embedding of the features into the weighing functions and choice of
the weighing function for each belief and uncertainty weights, which are dictated by a relationship
captured by artificial reasoning that makes it work regardless the attack types or devices.

9.2.5

Trust Management Update and Classification

We propose a trust management function that converts the time sequence of individual trust values
into a cumulative moving trust score for the instantaneous detection of devices upon attacks. The
next stage is classification and parameter learning, where a method for identifying a threshold and
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parameters of the trust scoring function is proposed.
Specifically, the real-time trust scores for each time window are fed to a trust management
and update module that counters temporal real-time evolution of real cyber-attacks. Specifically,
we propose a four-factor asymmetric trust update scheme that can defend against advanced attack
strategies such as on-off and incremental ramp attacks. We use a supervised and semi-supervised
approach to finding the threshold that could distinguish between steady compromised and honest
IoT devices.

9.2.6

Evaluation with Proof of Generality:

We evaluated our framework with data collected from real smart home IoT devices containing
labeled data for network traffic .pcap files for long durations (ten benign days and five attacked
days from UNSW), as well as across different datasets (CTU Malware dataset, simulated dataset
with varying attack strength). We had shown success against 12 different attack types and malware
campaigns on various IoT device types. The total hours for each device are approximately 350
hours obtained from [4]. Additionally, to prove our method is not dataset-specific we apply it 242
hours obtain from other datasets [5] and 69 hours of simulated data to prove generality.

9.3 Benefits and Limitations

In this section, we discuss some of the major beneficial as well as certain limiting aspects of our
framework.
The first benefit is that we take a unified (generic) approach towards attack detection and classification. The term unified means that the success of the detection of malicious devices or the trust
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scoring model is independent of attack types and IoT device/app heterogeneity. This is in contrast
to all existing works that learn patterns of different attack types [6, 7] or works for a given class
of IoT devices [8].
The second benefit is that our framework can be tuned to offer immediate real-time detection
unlike some existing works [4] that focus on retrospective identification (i.e., they take a whole
attack dataset and find some anomalous patterns at the end). In contrast, our work supports a realtime framework where the trust drops instantly for devices in the event of an attack. Thus, the time
to detection is much smaller and the impact of cyber-attacks is much smaller as well.
The third benefit is that our framework is able to handle uncertainty in the observation (evidence) and appropriately apply contextual factors that can adjust the effect of such uncertainty on
the trust level of each device. Essentially, uncertainty means that certain mismatches with an access control policy may be caused by benign changes, and they these changes need to be accounted
for to diminish false alarms.
The fourth benefit is that we take an API and Service level view instead of a device-level
view [9], while collecting the evidence that determines the trust scores. This is because devices
can offer various services over time and their behavioral nature changes with time. If a device
is using more APIs or services (hence talks to more servers or other devices), its s attack surface
becomes larger as compared to another device that uses a smaller set of services. Thus, the trust
model should be able to incorporate this aspect, which we do in our framework.
The framework is designed to be robust against intelligent strategies such as on-off (any attack
type that alternates between a period of attack versus no attack) and incremental ramp attack strategies (attack types where the attack volume in terms of bytes or packets is changed very slowly over
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time).
Some of the other minor benefits of this framework include the following: Our trust model
is designed in a way such that it is easy to understand rather than data from research papers that
apply several known ML techniques without any explanation on how they work, so it is difficult to
know the conditions under which they might fail. Additionally, unlike other research papers and
frameworks in this area, we show that the success of our method generalizes with minimal changes
across multiple real-world smart home datasets containing data from various device manufacturers.
Furthermore, the trust scoring method is simple enough to be usable by consumers who do not
have high technical knowledge. The consumers of a smart home can immediately block or disable
certain devices/services according to real-time trust scores at the FIoT that can be made available
to the end-user, instead of waiting for a service provider to declare a cyber-attack.
The disadvantage of our framework is that it does not handle byte level analysis of network
traffic. There are many cyber- attacks that maintain the packet volume , align themselves with the
access control rules using insider knowledge (or MUD profile knowledge) and launch attacks that
change the byte size of each packet. Our framework is not designed to capture such attacks. This
effort is left for future work.

9.3.1

Lessons Learned

The major things that we have learned while working on this report are:

1. Using Trust to provide a trust score for each IoT device.
2. Characteristics of trust.
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3. Smart home system model.
4. Collection of evidence from network traffic.
5. Trust calculations and updating trust values.

9.3.2

Future Work

In our future work, we will implement TIoT to detect multi SH or multi fog node attacks. We plan
to detect outgoing transmission sizes to detect privacy leakage attacks by authorized devices that
leak data to the same service provider without SH user authorization and ping of an attack.
We believe that security and privacy services in IoT systems can be improved by using our trust
scoring middleware deployed on the FIoT. This should improve the performance and efficiency
of security and privacy services, without imposing too much performance limitation on the IoT
devices.
Additionally, although not shown, multiple smart homes in a smart city can be managed by
deploying a similar TIOT at the cloud domain that manages and controls input feedback from
different trust middleware instances running in a decentralized manner at various FIoTs. Such
TIoT can facilitate controlling trust-based services by checking a service requestors trust value
and filtering out those requestors, if and when the requestors trust value is below the threshold
required for obtaining a service. This can be helpful in preventing large malware campaigns from
spreading across a geographical region.
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access control and authentication for the home internet of things (iot),” in Proceedings of
the 27th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, ser. SEC18, Baltimore, MD, USA:
USENIX Association, 2018, 255272, ISBN: 9781931971461.
[24] S. Yi and R. Kravets, “Moca : Mobile certificate authority for wireless ad hoc networks,”
The Second Annual PKI Research Workshop (PKI), Dec. 2004.

146

[25] J. Basu and V. Callaghan, “Towards a trust based approach to security and user confidence
in pervasive computing systems,” in The IEE International Workshop on Intelligent Environments, 2005 (Ref. No. 2005/11059), 2005, pp. 223–229.
[26] S. Ahamed and M. Sharmin, “A trust-based secure service discovery (tssd) model for pervasive computing,” Computer Communications, vol. 31, pp. 4281–4293, Dec. 2008.
[27] N. Shankar and W. Arbaugh, “On trust for ubiquitous computing,” Sep. 2002.
[28] F. Zhu, M. Mutka, and L. Ni, “Splendor: A secure, private, and location-aware service discovery protocol supporting mobile services,” Apr. 2003, pp. 235–242, ISBN: 0-7695-1893-1.
[29] M. A. Chaqfeh and N. Mohamed, “Challenges in middleware solutions for the internet
of things,” in 2012 International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems
(CTS), 2012, pp. 21–26.
[30] S. Bandyopadhyay, M. Sengupta, S. Maiti, and S. Dutta, “Role of middleware for internet
of things: A study,” International Journal of Computer Science Engineering Survey, vol. 2,
Aug. 2011.
[31] ——, “A survey of middleware for internet of things,” Communications in Computer and
Information Science Recent Trends in Wireless and Mobile Networks, 288296, 2011.
[32] M. A. Razzaque, M. Milojevic-Jevric, A. Palade, and S. Clarke, “Middleware for internet of
things: A survey,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 70–95, 2016.
[33] A. Ben Hamida, F. Kon, N. Lago, A. Zarras, D. Athanasopoulos, D. Pilios, P. Vassiliadis,
N. Georgantas, V. Issarny, G. Mathioudakis, G. Bouloukakis, Y. Jarma, S. Hachem, and A.
Pathak, “Integrated choreos middleware - enabling large-scale, qos-aware adaptive choreographies,” Sep. 2013.
[34] W. Wibisono, A. Zaslavsky, and S. Ling, “Comihoc: A middleware framework for context
management in manet environment,” in 2010 24th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, 2010, pp. 620–627.
[35] T. Renner, A. Kliem, and O. Kao, “The device cloud - applying cloud computing concepts
to the internet of things,” in 2014 IEEE 11th Intl Conf on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing and 2014 IEEE 11th Intl Conf on Autonomic and Trusted Computing and 2014 IEEE
14th Intl Conf on Scalable Computing and Communications and Its Associated Workshops,
2014, pp. 396–401.
[36] K. A., Cooperative device cloud, Berlin, 2015.
[37] P. Fremantle and P. Scott, “A survey of secure middleware for the internet of things,” PeerJ
Preprints, vol. 5, e1241v2, Mar. 2017. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.
7287/peerj.preprints.1241v2.
[38] F. Ramparany, F. Galn, J. Soriano, and T. Elsaleh, “Handling smart environment devices,
data and services at the semantic level with the fi-ware core platform,” Oct. 2014.
[39] A. Munir, P. Kansakar, and S. U. Khan, “Ifciot: Integrated fog cloud iot: A novel architectural paradigm for the future internet of things.,” IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine,
vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 74–82, 2017.
147

[40] J.-P. Arcangeli, A. Bouzeghoub, V. Camps, M.-F. Canut, S. Chabridon, D. Conan, T. Desprats, R. Laborde, E. Lavinal, S. Leriche, H. MAUREL, A. Pninou, C. Taconet, and P.
Zarat, “Incomemulti-scale context management for the internet of things,” vol. 7683, Nov.
2012.
[41] L. Lim, P. Marie, D. Conan, S. Chabridon, T. Desprats, and A. Manzoor, “Enhancing context
data distribution for the internet of things using qoc-awareness and attribute-based access
control,” Annals of telecommunications - annales des tlcommunications, vol. 71, Oct. 2015.
[42] What is linksmart - home. [Online]. Available: https : / / docs . linksmart . eu /
display/HOME/What.
[43] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, D. Miorandi, C. Cappiello, and A. Coen-Porisini, “A secure and
quality-aware prototypical architecture for the internet of things,” Information Systems, vol.
58, pp. 43 –55, 2016. [Online]. Available: http : / / www . sciencedirect . com /
science/article/pii/S0306437916300072.
[44] ——, “Security policy enforcement for networked smart objects,” Comput. Netw., vol. 108,
no. C, 133147, Oct. 2016. [Online]. Available: https : / / doi . org / 10 . 1016 / j .
comnet.2016.08.014.
[45] J. Soldatos, N. Kefalakis, M. Hauswirth, M. Serrano, J.-P. Calbimonte, M. Riahi, K. Aberer,
P. P. Jayaraman, A. Zaslavsky, I. Zarko, L. Skorin-Kapov, and R. Herzog, “Openiot: Open
source internet-of-things in the cloud,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9001, pp. 13–
25, Mar. 2015.
[46] Relayr iot middleware platform. [Online]. Available: https://relayr.io/en/.
[47] M. Caporuscio, P. Raverdy, and V. Issarny, “Ubisoap: A service-oriented middleware for
ubiquitous networking,” IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 86–
98, 2012.
[48] J. Al-Jaroodi, N. Mohamed, I. Jawhar, and S. Mahmoud, “Cotware: A cloud of things middleware,” in 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Workshops (ICDCSW), 2017, pp. 214–219.
[49] S. Gashti, G. Pujolle, and J. Rotrou, “An upnp-based context-aware framework for ubiquitous mesh home networks,” in 2009 IEEE 20th International Symposium on Personal,
Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, 2009, pp. 400–404.
[50] M. Bazzani, D. Conzon, A. Scalera, M. A. Spirito, and C. I. Trainito, “Enabling the iot
paradigm in e-health solutions through the virtus middleware,” in 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, 2012,
pp. 1954–1959.
[51] H. Desruelle, J. Lyle, S. Isenberg, and F. Gielen, “On the challenges of building a web-based
ubiquitous application platform,” Sep. 2012, pp. 733–736.
[52] C. U.U. D. of Justice, “Securing your internet of things devices justice,” 2017. [Online].
Available: https : / / www . justice . gov / criminal - ccips / page / file /
984001/download.
148

[53] V. Sivaraman, H. H. Gharakheili, C. Fernandes, N. Clark, and T. Karliychuk, “Smart iot devices in the home: Security and privacy implications,” IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 71–79, 2018.
[54] H. G.H.F. C. Sivaraman V., “Inside job: Security and privacy threats for smart-home iot
devices,” Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, 2017.
[55] G. Rajendran, R. S. Ragul Nivash, P. P. Parthy, and S. Balamurugan, “Modern security
threats in the internet of things (iot): Attacks and countermeasures,” in 2019 International
Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST), 2019, pp. 1–6.
[56] H. Shen, G. Bai, Y. Hu, and T. Wang, “P2ta: Privacy-preserving task allocation for edge computing enhanced mobile crowdsensing,” Journal of Systems Architecture, vol. 97, pp. 130–
141, 2019.
[57] At least 32,000 smart homes and businesses at risk of leaking data. [Online]. Available:
https://blog.avast.com/mqtt- vulnerabilities- hacking- smarthomes.
[58] The internet of things: Reduce security risks with automated policies, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/trends/iot/
docs/security-risks.pdf.
[59] M. N. Aman, M. H. Basheer, and B. Sikdar, “Two-factor authentication for iot with location
information,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 3335–3351, 2019.
[60] A. Joshy and M. J. Jalaja, “Design and implementation of an iot based secure biometric
authentication system,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Signal Processing, Informatics, Communication and Energy Systems (SPICES), 2017, pp. 1–13.
[61] Y. Zheng, S. S. Dhabu, and C. Chang, “Securing iot monitoring device using puf and physical layer authentication,” in 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(ISCAS), 2018, pp. 1–5.
[62] Locate ip address lookup show on map city of the ip. [Online]. Available: https : / /
infosniper.net/.
[63] What is malware? how malware works how to remove it. [Online]. Available: https :
//www.avg.com/en/signal/what-is-malware.
[64] E. Conrad, S. Misenar, and J. Feldman, “Chapter 7 - domain 7: Operations security,” in
Eleventh Hour CISSP (Second Edition), E. Conrad, S. Misenar, and J. Feldman, Eds., Second Edition, Boston: Syngress, 2014, pp. 117 –133, ISBN: 978-0-12-417142-8. [Online].
Available: http : / / www . sciencedirect . com / science / article / pii /
B9780124171428000078.
[65] The web performance security what is ssdp. [Online]. Available: https://www.cloudflare.
com/learning/ddos/ssdp-ddos-attack/.
[66] S. Bhattacharjee and M. Chatterjee, “Trust based channel preference in cognitive radio networks under collaborative selfish attacks,” in 2014 IEEE 25th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communication (PIMRC), 2014, pp. 1502–
1507.
149

[67] A. Jsang, “An algebra for assessing trust in certification chains,” Nov. 2001.
[68] S. Bhattacharjee, N. Ghosh, V. Shah, and S. Das, “Qnq: Quality and quantity based unified
approach for secure and trustworthy mobile crowdsensing,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, vol. PP, pp. 1–1, Dec. 2018.
[69] A. Josang and J. Haller, “Dirichlet reputation systems,” in The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES’07), 2007, pp. 112–119.
[70] S. Orgera, How to use wireshark: A complete tutorial, 2020. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.lifewire.com/wireshark-tutorial-4143298.

150

